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#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend an expansion of the scope of the United States core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### ‘Its’ means cooperation must be governmental

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin,” *2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808*, Lexis)

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Two standards

#### Predictable Limits—a bounded topic serves as a predictable stasis point for debate that guarantees thematic coherence there are a infinite amount of affs under their interp, making the neg prepare for them is impossible and favors the aff because they get leverage unpredictable offense—absent defined limits, debate’s competitive incentives create a race to the margins that distorts topic research and kills clash.

#### 2)Fairness---voluntary activities require it to actualize their benefits---only the ballot can adjudicate which model is fairest and overcome cognitive biases that otherwise cause a race to the bottom.

Hansson et al. 21, Kajsa Hansson, Ph.D. student at Linköping University, M.S. in Economics from Linköping University; Emil Persson, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics at Linköping University, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Gothenburg; Shai Davidai, Assistant Professor in the Management Division of Columbia Business School, Ph.D. from Cornell University; Gustav Tinghög, Associate Professor in the Department of Management and Engineering at Linköping University, “Losing sense of fairness: How information about a level playing field reduces selfish behavior,” Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization, Vol. 190, October 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.014

Why is aggressive, hostile, and selfish behavior so rampant in competitive settings? Using a novel experimental paradigm, we found that the absence of explicit information about a level playing field increases people’s tendency to engage in selfish behavior. Whereas participants who formed their own subjective beliefs about the fairness of a competition more frequently engaged in self-serving and selfish behavior, providing explicit information about the level playing field reduced such behavior. However, while this information reduced selfish behavior among losing participants, it did not affect behavior among winners of the competition. Losers who formed their own subjective beliefs of the playing field believed that the competition was unequally stacked against them. In contrast to losers who were informed about that both participants competed under the same sets of rules, they were more willing to engage in selfish behavior following the competition.

Our results suggest that information about a level playing field can reduce the “moral wiggle room” which people use to justify selfish behavior.9 Just as people are more prone to engage in selfish behavior when the consequences of their actions are sufficiently vague and uncertain, (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Exley, 2016; Haisley and Weber, 2010), we find that the absence of explicit information about the procedure of a competition may have similar effects on selfish behavior, and especially so among those who end up losing.

How well people perform in competitive settings is the product of numerous factors, many of which are beyond people’s control. For instance, whether people perform well or poorly in a competition is determined by their inherent ability or skill, by the amount of effort they devote to the competition, by their opponents’ abilities and skills, by the amount of effort devoted by each of their opponent, by external factors that advance or hinder their and their opponents’ performance, and so forth. People typically focus on only a subset of such factors when thinking about their and others’ performance (Davidai and Gilovich, 2015). Yet, the myriad of elements that influence performance provide people with sufficient flexibility to feel as if their relative inferiority is due to factors outside their control rather than personal inadequacy. Consequently, by forcing people to take responsibility for their performance and learn from their failures, informing people about a level playing field may have other positive effects beyond reducing selfish behavior.

Our results are consistent with findings from previous studies showing that losing a competition increases the demand for redistribution, even when people make choices for two other participants (i.e. absent any selfish motives) (Cassar and Klein, 2019; Deffains et al., 2016; Espinosa et al., 2020). In line with the results from our study, Espinosa (2020) showed that when participants are informed that outcomes of a competition is determined by brute luck — i.e., whether one was randomly assigned to perform either a hard or an easy task — before the competition begins, winners and losers of the competition display similar redistributive preferences when making decisions for other people. We add to this literature by showing that the effect of informing people about a level playing field also decreases selfish behavior. Although previous studies have found that actual procedural unfairness that involves unequal opportunities increases unethical and selfish behavior (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2018; Fehr, 2018; Gill et al., 2013; Greenberg, 1990; Grosch and Rau, 2020; John et al., 2014), our findings highlight the immensely important role that perceived procedural fairness plays in zero-sum competitions, where resources are scarce, and several people compete for the same rewards.

Because disagreements regarding fairness may result in aggression, hostility, and conflict between successful and unsuccessful individuals, understanding when and why the outcomes of competitions are considered legitimate is extremely important. Simply put, leaving people “in the dark” regarding the playing field may undermine cooperation, trust, and legitimacy in society. Unfortunately, this dynamic is often seen in our own back yard, where wayward researchers tend to lose sight of the common goal of the scientific endeavor and instead engage in misconduct, fraud, and uncooperative behavior to promote their own selfish goals (e.g., John et al., 2012). We suggest that by bolstering people’s beliefs about a level playing field, transparency can reduce such self-serving and often-destructive research practices. Whereas arranging fair procedures and practices is of upmost importance for creating a more just and ethical society, informing people about this procedural fairness is key.

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#### TECH LEADERSHIP DA:

#### US tech leadership is secure, BUT antitrust cedes it.

Abbott 21, JD, MA, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center focusing on antitrust, formerly served as the Federal Trade Commission’s General Counsel. (Alden, *et al*, 3-10-2021, “Aligning Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and National Security Policy”, *Regulatory Transparency Project of the Federalist Society*, pg. 2-5, <https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Paper-Aligning-Intellectual-Property-Antitrust-and-National-SecurityPolicy.pdf>)

II. The United States Plays a Critical Role in 5G Standards Development

The U.S. government has recognized that “5G is a critical strategic technology [such that] nations that master advanced communications technologies and ubiquitous connectivity will have a long-term economic and military advantage.”8 The U.S. has had a substantial technological edge over our military and intelligence rivals in foundational R&D for 5G and other next-generation technologies. U.S. companies have long been leaders in the development of previous generations of core mobile standards (2G, 3G, 4G, and LTE). This technological leadership has made it possible for U.S. companies to ensure the security and integrity of the hardware and software products that make up the backbone of the U.S. telecommunication systems. This leadership must continue for the U.S. government to more effectively anticipate potential security risks and take the necessary steps to protect national security.9

Despite this history of clear technological leadership, there are causes for concern. First, a very small number of U.S. companies have made the investments in the overwhelming majority of the R&D necessary to develop 5G.10 Historically, U.S. companies have heavily invested in R&D, which has propelled the U.S. into leadership positions in critical standard development organizations working on foundational next-generation technologies like 5G.11 U.S. companies like Qualcomm play a significant and important role in this process through innovation, patenting, and standard setting, but they are not alone in the global community of high-tech companies.12 Backed by their nations’ leadership, Chinese and Korean companies have also invested heavily in developing the core technologies for 5G.13

The willingness of U.S. companies to invest in R&D is threatened, however. The development of 5G is a bit like a race, with the companies who develop the best technology coming out ahead. While U.S. companies are savvy and talented competitors in this race, aggressive and unwarranted use of antitrust law by U.S. regulators, as well as by foreign antitrust authorities, threatens to put obstacles in these companies’ paths and hinder their ability to lead.

III. Overly Aggressive Antitrust Enforcement Hinders American Technological Leadership and Threatens National Security

As companies from around the world develop the technology and standards for 5G mobile devices and networks, American companies are under threat by aggressive antitrust enforcement that ultimately redounds to the benefit of these foreign companies, which are economic competitors in countries that are also military competitors of the U.S. Over the past five years, foreign governments, particularly in Asia, have subjected U.S. companies to antitrust investigations that failed to follow basic norms of the rule of law, such as providing basic due process protections.14 These antitrust investigations were a thinly-disguised effort by these countries to force the transfer of U.S. patented technology to their own domestic companies, or to insulate their domestic companies from American competition. In recent years, Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese antitrust authorities have brought nearly 30 investigations against 60 foreign companies across a range of industries, including manufacturing, life sciences, and technology.15

Antitrust challenges undermine intellectual property rights by forcing companies to license their products on non-market-based terms. One prominent example in U.S. history is when the Department of Justice wrung a concession from AT&T to license royalty-free the entire portfolio of 8,600 patents held by Bell Labs in a 1956 antitrust consent decree with the company.16 Today, the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy has observed that “China uses the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China not just to foster competition but also to force foreign companies to make concessions such as reduced prices and below-market royalty rates for licensed technology.”17 Companies have also complained about poor policy guidance and procedural protections under China’s competition laws.18 Others have complained about China’s use of its competition laws to promote policy objectives rather than protect competition and advance consumer welfare.19 In one example, companies raised concerns with Article 7 of China’s State Administration of Industry Commerce (SAIC) 2015 Rules on the Prohibition of Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition by Abusing Intellectual Property Rights.20 Under this provision, intellectual property constitutes an “essential facility,” which could allow parties to raise abuse of intellectual property rights claims against patent owners for a unilateral refusal to license their patents.21

Predatory antitrust enforcement actions threaten the ability of U.S. companies to continue to be leaders in 5G technological development. China and other nations with similarly restrictive regulatory frameworks can weaken the ability of the United States to compete in global markets by exacting high monetary penalties from U.S. intellectual property owners or forcing the transfer of their intellectual property to domestic commercial rivals. As a penalty for violations of its competition laws, China can impose exorbitant fines that range up to 10% of a foreign company’s entire revenue in the prior year.22 This is not a legal rule observed in the breach; it has already resulted in fines just shy of $1 billion.23

Another way in which courts in China and other foreign countries are harming U.S. companies is through the use of anti-suit injunctions. One example of this is in the recent patent infringement lawsuit brought by InterDigital, an American high-tech company that has developed key technologies in wireless telecommunication, against Chinese company Xiaomi. In June 2020, Xiaomi filed a lawsuit in the Wuhan Intermediate Court in China requesting that the court set global licensing rates for InterDigital’s patents on standardized technologies. In July 2020, InterDigital sued Xiaomi in India for infringement of InterDigital’s Indian patents. The Wuhan Intermediate Court then ordered InterDigital to stop its lawsuit with its request for an injunction in India. The Chinese court further prohibited InterDigital from suing Xiaomi and requesting an injunction or damages in the form of reasonable licensing rates, or even to enforce a previously-issued injunction, in any other country. If InterDigital does not comply with this worldwide injunction against pursuing legal relief for the violation of its patents in any other country, the company faces a significant fine in China. The type of judicial order issued by the Wuhan court is known as an anti-suit injunction and its purpose is to force an intellectual property dispute to play out solely in a Chinese court at the behest of the Chinese government. These court orders demonstrate China’s desire to become the source of 5G innovation and to dictate the licensing terms of the technology, and the anti-suit injunctions hamstring U.S. companies like InterDigital from enforcing their intellectual property rights anywhere in the world.

The unfair use of antitrust enforcement and related legal actions like anti-suit injunctions to weaken U.S. intellectual property rights around the world risks diminishing U.S. global competitiveness in critical technologies like 5G, and further empowers China and others to expand their influence over the evolving 5G technological ecosystem. To the extent the U.S. cedes its dominance in 5G standards development, China will continue its focused efforts to fill that void. Huawei, a China-based company, has increased its R&D spending while growing its share of patents on the standardized technologies comprising 5G.24 The President’s Council on Science and Technology issued a report concluding that Chinese actions in the semiconductor industry, which include a range of policies backed by over $100 billion in government funds, threaten U.S. leadership in the industry and present risks to U.S. national security.25 China’s “Made in China 2025” plan called for China to become a leader in 5G technology, including in the development of the standards for the technology, by 2020.26 The plan expressly favors Chinese domestic producers, calling for raising the domestic content of core components in high-tech industries like 5G to 70% by 2025.27

This issue, however, extends far beyond simply the ability and willingness of U.S. companies to engage in the requisite R&D to participate in the 5G race. Reduced U.S. influence on 5G standard-setting would force the U.S. government to rely on untrusted foreign companies for its 5G product supply. The Department of the Treasury has expressed concern about the “well-known” U.S. national security risks posed by Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications companies.28

#### Revisionist tech leadership causes nuclear war.

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Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict.

International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage.

You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power.

For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine.

Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.”

If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war.

If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member.

Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation.

This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly.

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#### PIC:

#### We affirm the entirety of the 1AC absent their decision to relate to the topic- Any 2AC answer to to T is a net benefit to the PIC.

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#### The inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

**Vote negative to theorize form AND content specifically in the context of refusal/**

**Grande 2018**

(Sandy Grande, Professor at Connecticut College, “Refusing the University”, 2018, <https://www.academia.edu/37026360/Refusing_the_University>)

In the broader field of critical theory, the work of Marcuse (1964) is central to theorizations of refusal. His central argument is that in modern capitalist societies— where worth is equated with the “reproduction of value” and “extraction of profit”— human beings only exist as “an instrumental means” of capital and, within this context, “simply to exist, to be, is an act of refusal” (Garland, 2013, p. 376). As such, refusal should not be confused with “passive withdrawal or retreat” but rather understood as an active instantiation of “a radically different mode- of- being and mode- of- doing” (p. 375). Frank Wilderson (2003) troubles the capitalist foundation of refusal from the standpoint of Black subjectivity. Specifically, in distinction to what he refers to as the “coherent” subjects of anti- capitalist struggle (e.g., the worker, the immigrant, the woman), Wilderson posits the “incoherence” of Black subjects (i.e., the unwaged slave, the prison slave) as destabilizing, as “the unthought” of historical materialism (pp. 21– 22). He writes: Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous…not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a negative dialectic: a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm a “program of complete disorder.” (Wilderson, 2003, p. 26) Within this context, Black refusal is theorized as “an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation)” (Wilderson, 2003, p. 26). Taking into account the power relations of both capitalism and white supremacy, Indigenous scholars posit refusal as a positive stance that is: less oriented around attaining an affirmative form of recognition… and more about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and tradition in ways that seek to prefigure… a radical alternative to the structural and psycho- affective facets of colonial domination. (Coulthard, 2007, p. 456) In this way, Indigenous refusal both negatively rejects the (false) promise of inclusion and other inducements of the settler state and positively asserts Indigenous sovereignty and peoplehood. In Mohawk Interruptus (2014), Audra Simpson theorizes refusal as distinct from resistance in that it does not take authority as a given. More specifically, at the heart of the text, she theorizes refusal at the “level of method and representation,” exposing the colonialist underpinnings of the “demand to know” as a settler logic. In response, she develops the notion of ethnographic refusal as a stance or space for Indigenous subjects to limit access to what is knowable and to being known, articulating how refusal works “in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that ‘this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights’ ” (Simpson, 2007, p. 73). Mignolo (2011) and Quijano (1991) similarly take up refusal in relation to knowledge formation, asserting Indigenous knowledge itself as a form of refusal; a space of epistemic disobedience that is “delinked” from Western, liberal, capitalist understandings of knowledge as production. Gómez- Barris (2012) theorizes the Mapuche hunger strikes as “an extreme bodily performance and political instantiation” of refusal, an act wherein their starving bodies upon the land literally enact what it means to live in a state of permanent war (p. 120). Understood as expressions of sovereignty, such acts of refusal threaten the settler state, carrying dire if not deadly consequences for Indigenous subjects. As noted by Ferguson (2015), “capitalist settler states prefer resistance” because it can be “negotiated or recognized,” but refusal “throws into doubt” the entire system and is therefore more dangerous. While within the university the consequences of academic refusal are much less dire, they still carry a risk. To refuse inclusion offends institutional authorities offering “the gift” of belonging, creating conditions of precarity for the refuser. For example, refusal to participate in the politics of respectability that characterizes institutional governance can result in social isolation, administrative retribution, and struggles with self- worth. Similarly, the refusal to comply with the normative structures of tenure and promotion (e.g., emphasizing quantity over quality; publishing in “mainstream” journals) can and does lead to increased marginalization, exploitation, and job loss.16 And, in a system where Indigenous scholars comprise less than 1% of the professorate, such consequences not only bear hardships for individuals but also whole communities. That said, academic “rewards” and inducements accessed through recognition- based politics can have even deeper consequences. As Jodi Byrd (2011) reminds us, the colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and minds will not be ended by “further inclusion or more participation” (Byrd, 2011, p. xxvi). The inspirational work of Black radical and Indigenous scholars compels thinking beyond the limits of academic recognition and about the generative spaces of refusal that not only reject settler logics but also foster possibilities of co- resistance. The prospect of coalition re- raises one of the initial animating questions of this chapter: What kinds of solidarities can be developed among peoples with a shared commitment to working beyond the imperatives of capital and the settler state? Clearly, despite the ubiquitous and often overly facile calls for solidarity, building effective coalitions is deeply challenging, even among insurgent scholars. Within this particular context, tensions between Indigenous sovereignty and decolonial projects and anti- racist, social justice projects, raise a series of suspicions: whether calls for Indigenous sovereignty somehow elide the a priori condition of blackness (the “unsovereign” subject),17 whether anti- racist struggles sufficiently account for Indigenous sovereignty as a land- based struggle elucidated outside regimes of property, and whether theorizations of settler colonialism sufficiently account for the forces and structures of white supremacy, racial slavery, and antiblackness. Rather than posit such tensions as terminally incommensurable, however, I want to suggest a parallel politics of dialectical co- resistance. When Black peoples can still be killed but not murdered; when Indians are still made to disappear; when (Indigenous) land and Black bodies are still destroyed and accumulated for settler profit; it is incumbent upon all those who claim a commitment to refusing the white supremacist, capitalist, settler state, to do the hard work of building “interconnected movements for decolonization” (Coulthard, 2014). The struggle is real. It is both material and psychological, both method and politics, and thus must necessarily straddle the both/ and (as opposed to either/or) coordinates of revolutionary change. In terms of process, this means working simultaneously beyond resistance and through the enactment of refusal— as fugitive, abolitionist, and Indigenous, sovereign subjects. Within the context of the university, this means replacing calls for more inclusive and diverse, safe spaces within the university with the development of a network of sovereign, safe houses outside the university. Kelley reminds us of the long history of this struggle, recalling the Institute of the Black World at Atlanta University (1969), the Mississippi Freedom Schools, and the work of Black feminists Patricia Robinson, Donna Middleton, and Patricia Haden as inspirational models. As a contemporary model, he references Harney and Moten’s vision of the undercommons as a space of possibility: a fugitive space wherein the pursuit of knowledge is not perceived as a path toward upward mobility and material wealth but rather as a means toward eradicating oppression in all of its forms (Undercommoning Collective). The ultimate goal, according to Kelley (2016), is to create in the present a future that overthrows the logic of neoliberalism. Scholars within Native studies similarly build upon a long tradition of refusing the university, theorizing from and about sovereignty through land- based models of education. Whereas a fugitive flees and seeks to escape, the Indigenous stands ground or, as Deborah Bird points out, “to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home” (as cited in Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). The ultimate goal of Indigenous refusal is Indigenous resurgence; a struggle that includes but is not limited to the return of Indigenous land. Again, while the aims may be different (and in some sense competing), efforts toward the development of parallel projects of co- resistance are possible through vigilant and sustained engagement. The “common ground” here is not necessarily literal but rather conceptual, a corpus of shared ethics and analytics: anti- capitalist, feminist, anti- colonial. Rather than allies, we are accomplices— plotting the death but not murder of the settler university. Toward this end, I offer some additional strategies for refusing the university: First and foremost, we need to commit to collectivity— to staging a refusal of the individualist promise project of the settler state and its attendant institutions. This requires that we engage in a radical and ongoing reflexivity about who we are and how we situate ourselves in the world. This includes but is not limited to a refusal of the cycle of individualized inducements— particularly, the awards, appointments, and grants that require complicity or allegiance to institutions that continue to oppress and dispossess. It is also a call to refuse the perceived imperative to self- promote, to brand one’s work and body. This includes all the personal webpages, incessant Facebook updates, and Twitter feeds featuring our latest accomplishments, publications, grants, rewards, etc. etc. Just. Make. It. Stop. The journey is not about self— which means it is not about promotion and tenure— it is about the disruption and dismantling of those structures and processes that create hierarchies of individual worth and labor. Second, we must commit to reciprocity— the kind that is primarily about being answerable to those communities we claim as our own and those we claim to serve. It is about being answerable to each other and our work. One of the many things lost to the pressures of the publish- or- perish, quantity-over-quality neoliberal regime is the loss of good critique. We have come to confuse support with sycophantic praise and critical evaluation with personal injury. Through the ethic of reciprocity, we need to remind ourselves that accountability to the collective requires a commitment to engage, extend, trouble, speak back to, and intensify our words and deeds. Third, we need to commit to mutuality, which implies reciprocity but is ultimately more encompassing. It is about the development of social relations not contingent upon the imperatives of capital— that refuses exploitation at the same time as it radically asserts connection, particularly to land. Inherent to a land- based ethic is a commitment to slowness and to the arc of inter- generational resurgence and transformation. One of the many ways that the academy recapitulates colonial logics is through the overvaluing of fast, new, young, and individualist voices and the undervaluing of slow, elder, and collective ones. And in such a system, relations and paradigms of connection, mutuality, and collectivity are inevitably undermined. For Indigenous peoples, such begin and end with land, centering questions of what it means to be a good relative. Toward this end, I have been thinking a lot lately about the formation of a new scholarly collective, one that writes and researches under a nom de guerre— like the Black feminist scholars and activists who wrote under and through the Combahee River Collective or the more recent collective of scholars and activists publishing as “the uncertain commons.”18 If furthering the aims of insurgence and resurgence (and not individual recognition) is what we hold paramount, then perhaps one of the most radical refusals we can authorize is to work together as one; to enact a kind of Zapatismo scholarship and a balaclava politics where the work of the collectivity is intentionally structured to obscure and transcend the single voice, body, and life. Together we could write in refusal of liberal, essentialist forms of identity politics, of individualist inducements, of capitalist imperatives, and other productivist logics of accumulation. This is what love as refusal looks like. It is the un- demand, the un- desire to be either of or in the university. It is the radical assertion to be on: land. Decolonial love is land.

## Case

### 1NC- Frontline

#### Prosaic material incentives explain contemporary anti-blackness far better than ontology

**Harari 15** [Yuval Noah Harari, Israeli historian and a tenured professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, specializing in World History, Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford University, and an acclaimed author whose first book, Sapiens, was an international bestseller that received lavish praise by figures ranging from Barack Obama to Bill Gates, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind,* tr. by Yuval Harari with help from John Purcell and Haim Watzman, HarperCollins: Broadway, NY, 2015, p. 133-144]

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN HISTORY IN THE millennia following the Agricultural Revolution boils down to a single question: how did humans organise themselves in mass-cooperation networks, when they lacked the biological instincts necessary to sustain such networks? The short answer is that humans created imagined orders and devised scripts. These two inventions filled the gaps left by our biological inheritance.

However, the appearance of these networks was, for many, a dubious blessing. The imagined orders sustaining these networks were neither neutral nor fair. They divided people into make-believe groups, arranged in a hierarchy. The upper levels enjoyed privileges and power, while the lower ones suffered from discrimination and oppression. Hammurabi’s Code, for example, established a pecking order of superiors, commoners and slaves. Superiors got all the good things in life. Commoners got what was left. Slaves got a beating if they complained.

Despite its proclamation of the equality of all men, the imagined order established by the Americans in 1776 also established a hierarchy. It created a hierarchy between men, who benefited from it, and women, whom it left disempowered. It created a hierarchy between whites, who enjoyed liberty, and blacks and American Indians, who were considered humans of a lesser type and therefore did not share in the equal rights of men. Many of those who signed the Declaration of Independence were slaveholders. They did not release their slaves upon signing the Declaration, nor did they consider themselves hypocrites. In their view, the rights of men had little to do with Negroes.

The American order also consecrated the hierarchy between rich and poor. Most Americans at that time had little problem with the inequality caused by wealthy parents passing their money and businesses on to their children. In their view, equality meant simply that the same laws applied to rich and poor. It had nothing to do with unemployment benefits, integrated education or health insurance.

Liberty, too, carried very different connotations than it does today. In 1776, it did not mean that the disempowered (certainly not blacks or Indians or, God forbid, women) could gain and exercise power. It meant simply that the state could not, except in unusual circumstances, confiscate a citizen’s private property or tell him what to do with it. The American order thereby upheld the hierarchy of wealth, which some thought was mandated by God and others viewed as representing the immutable laws of nature. Nature, it was claimed, rewarded merit with wealth while penalising indolence.

All the above-mentioned distinctions – between free persons and slaves, between whites and blacks, between rich and poor – are rooted in fictions. (The hierarchy of men and women will be discussed later.) Yet it is an iron rule of history that every imagined hierarchy disavows its fictional origins and claims to be natural and inevitable. For instance, many people who have viewed the hierarchy of free persons and slaves as natural and correct have argued that slavery is not a human invention. Hammurabi saw it as ordained by the gods. Aristotle argued that slaves have a ‘slavish nature’ whereas free people have a ‘free nature’. Their status in society is merely a reflection of their innate nature.

Ask white supremacists about the racial hierarchy, and you are in for a pseudoscientific lecture concerning the biological differences between the races. You are likely to be told that there is something in Caucasian blood or genes that makes whites naturally more intelligent, moral and hardworking. Ask a diehard capitalist about the hierarchy of wealth, and you are likely to hear that it is the inevitable outcome of objective differences in abilities. The rich have more money, in this view, because they are more capable and diligent. No one should be bothered, then, if the wealthy get better health care, better education and better nutrition. The rich richly deserve every perk they enjoy.

People with lighter skin colour are typically more in danger of sunburn than people with darker skin. Yet there was no biological logic behind the division of South African beaches. Beaches reserved for people with lighter skin were not characterised by lower levels of ultraviolet radiation.

Hindus who adhere to the caste system believe that cosmic forces have made one caste superior to another. According to a famous Hindu creation myth, the gods fashioned the world out of the body of a primeval being, the Purusa. The sun was created from the Purusa’s eye, the moon from the Purusa’s brain, the Brahmins (priests) from its mouth, the Kshatriyas (warriors) from its arms, the Vaishyas (peasants and merchants) from its thighs, and the Shudras (servants) from its legs. Accept this explanation and the sociopolitical differences between Brahmins and Shudras are as natural and eternal as the differences between the sun and the moon.1 The ancient Chinese believed that when the goddess Nü Wa created humans from earth, she kneaded aristocrats from fine yellow soil, whereas commoners were formed from brown mud.2

Yet, to the best of our understanding, these hierarchies are all the product of human imagination. Brahmins and Shudras were not really created by the gods from different body parts of a primeval being. Instead, the distinction between the two castes was created by laws and norms invented by humans in northern India about 3,000 years ago. Contrary to Aristotle, there is no known biological difference between slaves and free people. Human laws and norms have turned some people into slaves and others into masters. Between blacks and whites there are some objective biological differences, such as skin colour and hair type, but there is no evidence that the differences extend to intelligence or morality.

Most people claim that their social hierarchy is natural and just, while those of other societies are based on false and ridiculous criteria. Modern Westerners are taught to scoff at the idea of racial hierarchy. They are shocked by laws prohibiting blacks to live in white neighbourhoods, or to study in white schools, or to be treated in white hospitals. But the hierarchy of rich and poor – which mandates that rich people live in separate and more luxurious neighbourhoods, study in separate and more prestigious schools, and receive medical treatment in separate and better-equipped facilities – seems perfectly sensible to many Americans and Europeans. Yet it’s a proven fact that most rich people are rich for the simple reason that they were born into a rich family, while most poor people will remain poor throughout their lives simply because they were born into a poor family.

Unfortunately, complex human societies seem to require imagined hierarchies and unjust discrimination. Of course not all hierarchies are morally identical, and some societies suffered from more extreme types of discrimination than others, yet scholars know of no large society that has been able to dispense with discrimination altogether. Time and again people have created order in their societies by classifying the population into imagined categories, such as superiors, commoners and slaves; whites and blacks; patricians and plebeians; Brahmins and Shudras; or rich and poor. These categories have regulated relations between millions of humans by making some people legally, politically or socially superior to others.

Hierarchies serve an important function. They enable complete strangers to know how to treat one another without wasting the time and energy needed to become personally acquainted. In George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, Henry Higgins doesn’t need to establish an intimate acquaintance with Eliza Doolittle in order to understand how he should relate to her. Just hearing her talk tells him that she is a member of the underclass with whom he can do as he wishes – for example, using her as a pawn in his bet to pass off a jower girl as a duchess. A modern Eliza working at a jorist’s needs to know how much effort to put into selling roses and gladioli to the dozens of people who enter the shop each day. She can’t make a detailed enquiry into the tastes and wallets of each individual.

Instead, she uses social cues – the way the person is dressed, his or her age, and if she’s not politically correct his skin colour. That is how she immediately distinguishes between the accounting-firm partner who’s likely to place a large order for expensive roses, and a messenger boy who can only afford a bunch of daisies.

Of course, differences in natural abilities also play a role in the formation of social distinctions. But such diversities of aptitudes and character are usually mediated through imagined hierarchies. This happens in two important ways. First and foremost, most abilities have to be nurtured and developed. Even if somebody is born with a particular talent, that talent will usually remain latent if it is not fostered, honed and exercised. Not all people get the same chance to cultivate and refine their abilities. Whether or not they have such an opportunity will usually depend on their place within their society’s imagined hierarchy. Harry Potter is a good example. Removed from his distinguished wizard family and brought up by ignorant muggles, he arrives at Hogwarts without any experience in magic. It takes him seven books to gain a firm command of his powers and knowledge of his unique abilities.

Second, even if people belonging to different classes develop exactly the same abilities, they are unlikely to enjoy equal success because they will have to play the game by different rules. If, in British-ruled India, an Untouchable, a Brahmin, a Catholic Irishman and a Protestant Englishman had somehow developed exactly the same business acumen, they still would not have had the same chance of becoming rich. The economic game was rigged by legal restrictions and unoɽcial glass ceilings.

The Vicious Circle

All societies are based on imagined hierarchies, but not necessarily on the same hierarchies. What accounts for the differences? Why did traditional Indian society classify people according to caste, Ottoman society according to religion, and American society according to race? In most cases the hierarchy originated as the result of a set of accidental historical circumstances and was then perpetuated and refined over many generations as different groups developed vested interests in it.

For instance, many scholars surmise that the Hindu caste system took shape when Indo-Aryan people invaded the Indian subcontinent about 3,000 years ago, subjugating the local population. The invaders established a stratified society, in which they – of course – occupied the leading positions (priests and warriors), leaving the natives to live as servants and slaves. The invaders, who were few in number, feared losing their privileged status and unique identity. To forestall this danger, they divided the population into castes, each of which was required to pursue a specific occupation or perform a specific role in society. Each had different legal status, privileges and duties. Mixing of castes – social interaction, marriage, even the sharing of meals – was prohibited. And the distinctions were not just legal – they became an inherent part of religious mythology and practice.

The rulers argued that the caste system rejected an eternal cosmic reality rather than a chance historical development. Concepts of purity and impurity were essential elements in Hindu religion, and they were harnessed to buttress the social pyramid. Pious Hindus were taught that contact with members of a different caste could pollute not only them personally, but society as a whole, and should therefore be abhorred. Such ideas are hardly unique to Hindus. Throughout history, and in almost all societies, concepts of pollution and purity have played a leading role in enforcing social and political divisions and have been exploited by numerous ruling classes to maintain their privileges. The fear of pollution is not a complete fabrication of priests and princes, however. It probably has its roots in biological survival mechanisms that make humans feel an instinctive revulsion towards potential disease carriers, such as sick persons and dead bodies. If you want to keep any human group isolated – women, Jews, Roma, gays, blacks – the best way to do it is convince everyone that these people are a source of pollution.

The Hindu caste system and its attendant laws of purity became deeply embedded in Indian culture. Long after the Indo-Aryan invasion was forgotten, Indians continued to believe in the caste system and to abhor the pollution caused by caste mixing. Castes were not immune to change. In fact, as time went by, large castes were divided into sub-castes. Eventually the original four castes turned into 3,000 different groupings called jati (literally ‘birth’). But this proliferation of castes did not change the basic principle of the system, according to which every person is born into a particular rank, and any infringement of its rules pollutes the person and society as a whole. A persons jati determines her profession, the food she can eat, her place of residence and her eligible marriage partners. Usually a person can marry only within his or her caste, and the resulting children inherit that status.

Whenever a new profession developed or a new group of people appeared on the scene, they had to be recognised as a caste in order to receive a legitimate place within Hindu society. Groups that failed to win recognition as a caste were, literally, outcasts – in this stratified society, they did not even occupy the lowest rung. They became known as Untouchables. They had to live apart from all other people and scrape together a living in humiliating and disgusting ways, such as sifting through garbage dumps for scrap material. Even members of the lowest caste avoided mingling with them, eating with them, touching them and certainly marrying them. In modern India, matters of marriage and work are still heavily influenced by the caste system, despite all attempts by the democratic government of India to break down such distinctions and convince Hindus that there is nothing polluting in caste mixing.3

Purity in America

A similar vicious circle perpetuated the racial hierarchy in modern America. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the European conquerors imported millions of African slaves to work the mines and plantations of America. They chose to import slaves from Africa rather than from Europe or East Asia due to three circumstantial factors. Firstly, Africa was closer, so it was cheaper to import slaves from Senegal than from Vietnam.

Secondly, in Africa there already existed a well-developed slave trade (exporting slaves mainly to the Middle East), whereas in Europe slavery was very rare. It was obviously far easier to buy slaves in an existing market than to create a new one from scratch.

Thirdly, and most importantly, American plantations in places such as Virginia, Haiti and Brazil were plagued by malaria and yellow fever, which had originated in Africa. Africans had acquired over the generations a partial genetic immunity to these diseases, whereas Europeans were totally defenceless and died in droves.

It was consequently wiser for a plantation owner to invest his money in an African slave than in a European slave or indentured labourer. Paradoxically, genetic superiority (in terms of immunity) translated into social inferiority: precisely because Africans were fitter in tropical climates than Europeans, they ended up as the slaves of European masters! Due to these circumstantial factors, the burgeoning new societies of America were to be divided into a ruling caste of white Europeans and a subjugated caste of black Africans.

But people don’t like to say that they keep slaves of a certain race or origin simply because it’s economically expedient. Like the Aryan conquerors of India, white Europeans in the Americas wanted to be seen not only as economically successful but also as pious, just and objective. Religious and scientific myths were pressed into service to justify this division. Theologians argued that Africans descend from Ham, son of Noah, saddled by his father with a curse that his offspring would be slaves. Biologists argued that blacks are less intelligent than whites and their moral sense less developed. Doctors alleged that blacks live in filth and spread diseases – in other words, they are a source of pollution.

These myths struck a chord in American culture, and in Western culture generally. They continued to exert their influence long after the conditions that created slavery had disappeared. In the early nineteenth century imperial Britain outlawed slavery and stopped the Atlantic slave trade, and in the decades that followed slavery was gradually outlawed throughout the American continent.

Notably, this was the first and only time in history that slaveholding societies voluntarily abolished slavery. But, even though the slaves were freed, the racist myths that justified slavery persisted. Separation of the races was maintained by racist legislation and social custom.

The result was a self-reinforcing cycle of cause and effect, a vicious circle.

Consider, for example, the southern United States immediately after the Civil War. In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution outlawed slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment mandated that citizenship and the equal protection of the law could not be denied on the basis of race. However, two centuries of slavery meant that most black families were far poorer and far less educated than most white families. A black person born in Alabama in 1865 thus had much less chance of getting a good education and a well-paid job than did his white neighbours. His children, born in the 1880S and 1890s, started life with the same disadvantage – they, too, were born to an uneducated, poor family.

But economic disadvantage was not the whole story. Alabama was also home to many poor whites who lacked the opportunities available to their better-off racial brothers and sisters. In addition, the Industrial Revolution and the waves of immigration made the United States an extremely fluid society, where rags could quickly turn into riches. If money was all that mattered, the sharp divide between the races should soon have blurred, not least through intermarriage.

But that did not happen. By 1865 whites, as well as many blacks, took it to be a simple matter of fact that blacks were less intelligent, more violent and sexually dissolute, lazier and less concerned about personal cleanliness than whites. They were thus the agents of violence, theft, rape and disease – in other words, pollution. If a black Alabaman in 1895 miraculously managed to get a good education and then applied for a respectable job such as a bank teller, his odds of being accepted were far worse than those of an equally qualified white candidate. The stigma that labelled blacks as, by nature, unreliable, lazy and less intelligent conspired against him.

You might think that people would gradually understand that these stigmas were myth rather than fact and that blacks would be able, over time, to prove themselves just as competent, law-abiding and clean as whites. In fact, the opposite happened – these prejudices became more and more entrenched as time went by. Since all the best jobs were held by whites, it became easier to believe that blacks really are inferior. ‘Look,’ said the average white citizen, ‘blacks have been free for generations, yet there are almost no black professors, lawyers, doctors or even bank tellers. Isn’t that proof that blacks are simply less intelligent and hard-working?’ Trapped in this vicious circle, blacks were not hired for whitecollar jobs because they were deemed unintelligent, and the proof of their inferiority was the paucity of blacks in white-collar jobs.

The vicious circle did not stop there. As anti-black stigmas grew stronger, they were translated into a system of ‘Jim Crow’ laws and norms that were meant to safeguard the racial order. Blacks were forbidden to vote in elections, to study in white schools, to buy in white stores, to eat in white restaurants, to sleep in white hotels. The justification for all of this was that blacks were foul, slothful and vicious, so whites had to be protected from them. Whites did not want to sleep in the same hotel as blacks or to eat in the same restaurant, for fear of diseases. They did not want their children learning in the same school as black children, for fear of brutality and bad influences. They did not want blacks voting in elections, since blacks were ignorant and immoral. These fears were substantiated by scientific studies that ‘proved’ that blacks were indeed less educated, that various diseases were more common among them, and that their crime rate was far higher (the studies ignored the fact that these ‘facts’ resulted from discrimination against blacks).

By the mid-twentieth century, segregation in the former Confederate states was probably worse than in the late nineteenth century. Clennon King, a black student who applied to the University of Mississippi in 1958, was forcefully committed to a mental asylum. The presiding judge ruled that a black person must surely be insane to think that he could be admitted to the University of Mississippi.

The vicious circle: a chance historical situation is translated into a rigid social system.

Nothing was as revolting to American southerners (and many northerners) as sexual relations and marriage between black men and white women. Sex between the races became the greatest taboo and any violation, or suspected violation, was viewed as deserving immediate and summary punishment in the form of lynching. The Ku Klux Klan, a white supremacist secret society, perpetrated many such killings. They could have taught the Hindu Brahmins a thing or two about purity laws.

With time, the racism spread to more and more cultural arenas. American aesthetic culture was built around white standards of beauty. The physical attributes of the white race – for example light skin, fair and straight hair, a small upturned nose – came to be identified as beautiful. Typical black features – dark skin, dark and bushy hair, a flattened nose – were deemed ugly. These preconceptions ingrained the imagined hierarchy at an even deeper level of human consciousness.

Such vicious circles can go on for centuries and even millennia, perpetuating an imagined hierarchy that sprang from a chance historical occurrence. Unjust discrimination often gets worse, not better, with time. Money comes to money, and poverty to poverty. Education comes to education, and ignorance to ignorance. Those once victimised by history are likely to be victimised yet again. And those whom history has privileged are more likely to be privileged again.

Most sociopolitical hierarchies lack a logical or biological basis – they are nothing but the perpetuation of chance events supported by myths. That is one good reason to study history. If the division into blacks and whites or Brahmins and Shudras was grounded in biological realities – that is, if Brahmins really had better brains than Shudras – biology would be sufficient for understanding human society. Since the biological distinctions between different groups of Homo sapiens are, in fact, negligible, biology can’t explain the intricacies of Indian society or American racial dynamics. We can only understand those phenomena by studying the events, circumstances, and power relations that transformed figments of imagination into cruel – and very real – social structures.

#### humanism is good --- context is always key and narratives of humanity are contingent

**Lester 12** – (January 2012, Alan, Director of Interdisciplinary Research, Professor of Historical Geography, and Co-Director of the Colonial and Postcolonial Studies Network, University of Sussex, “Humanism, race and the colonial frontier,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 37, Issue 1, pages 132–148)

Anderson argues that it is not an issue of extending humanity to … negatively racialised people, but of putting into question that from which such people have been excluded – that which, for liberal discourse, remains unproblematised. (2007, 199) I fear, however, that if we direct attention away from histories of humanism’s failure to deal with difference and to render that difference compatible with its fundamental universalism, and if we overlook its proponents’ failed attempts to combat dispossession, murder and oppression; if our history of race is instead understood through a critique of humanity’s conceptual separation from nature, we dilute the political potency of universalism. Historically, it was not humanism that gave rise to racial innatism, it was the specifically anti-humanist politics of settlers forging new social assemblages through relations of violence on colonial frontiers. Settler communities became established social assemblages in their own right specifically through the rejection of humanist interventions. Perhaps, as Edward Said suggested, we can learn from the implementation of humanist universalism in practice, and insist on its potential to combat racism, and perhaps we can insist on the contemporary conceptual hybridisation of human–non-human entities too, without necessarily abandoning all the precepts of humanism (Said 2004; Todorov 2002). We do not necessarily need to accord a specific value to the human, separate from and above nature, in order to make a moral and political case for a fundamental human universalism that can be wielded strategically against racial violence. Nineteenth century humanitarians’ universalism was fundamentally conditioned by their belief that British culture stood at the apex of a hierarchical order of civilisations. From the mid-nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, this ethnocentrism produced what Lyotard describes as ‘the flattening of differences, or the demand for a norm (“human nature”)’, that ‘carries with it its own forms of terror’ (cited Braun 2004, 1352). The intervention of Aboriginal Protection demonstrates that humanist universalism has the potential to inflict such terror (it was the Protectorate of Aborigines Office reincarnated that was responsible, later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for Aboriginal Australia’s Stolen Generation, and it was the assimilationist vision of the Protectors’ equivalents in Canada that led to the abuses of the Residential Schools system). But we must not forget that humanism’s alternatives, founded upon principles of difference rather than commonality, have the potential to do the same and even worse. In the nineteenth century, Caribbean planters and then emigrant British settlers emphasised the multiplicity of the human species, the absence of any universal ‘human nature’, the incorrigibility of difference, in their upholding of biological determinism. Their assault on any notion of a fundamental commonality among human beings has disconcerting points of intersection with the radical critique of humanism today. The scientific argument of the nineteenth century that came closest to post-humanism’s insistence on the hybridity of humanity, promising to ‘close the ontological gap between human and non-human animals’ (Day 2008, 49), was the evolutionary theory of biological descent associated with Darwin, and yet this theory was adopted in Aotearoa New Zealand and other colonial sites precisely to legitimate the potential extinction of other, ‘weaker’ races in the face of British colonisation on the grounds of the natural law of a struggle for survival (Stenhouse 1999). Both the upholding and the rejection of human–nature binaries can thus result in racially oppressive actions, depending on the contingent politics of specific social assemblages. Nineteenth century colonial humanitarians, inspired as they were by an irredeemably ethnocentric and religiously exclusive form of universalism, at least combatted exterminatory settler discourses and practices at multiple sites of empire, and provided spaces on mission and protectorate stations in which indigenous peoples could be shielded to a very limited extent from dispossession and murder. They also, unintentionally, reproduced discourses of a civilising mission and of a universal humanity that could be deployed by anticolonial nationalists in other sites of empire that were never invaded to the same extent by settlers, in independence struggles from the mid-twentieth century. Finally, as Whatmore’s (2002) analysis of the Select Committee on Aborigines reveals, they provided juridical narratives that are part of the arsenal of weapons that indigenous peoples can wield in attempts to claim redress and recompense in a postcolonial world. The politics of humanism in practice, then, was riddled with contradiction, fraught with particularity and latent with varying possibilities. It could be relatively progressive and liberatory; it could be dispossessive and culturally genocidal. Within its repertoire lay potential to combat environmental and biological determinism and innatism, however, and this should not be forgotten in a rush to condemn humanism’s universalism as well as its anthropocentrism. It is in the tensions within universalism that the ongoing potential of an always provisional, self-conscious, flexible and strategic humanism – one that now recognises the continuity between the human and the non-human as well as the power-laden particularities of the male, middle class, Western human subject – resides.

#### You cannot “escape” pre-existing modes of relationality---attempts to do so re-create aff harms.

Love 15 – Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania [Heather, ““Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary,” *differences* Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 89-91]

Today, queer studies – prestigious but unevenly institutionalized – still signals absolute refusal or criticality – all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration.

Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it, to participate in active revolt against profes- sional and disciplinary protocols. To o er an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. Objectification – recognition, description, critique – can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense.

Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, both the political and the methodological antinormativity of queer studies have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality. Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines – and the production of knowledge about social deviance – are essential. Undertaking such work, however, will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history – we are its contemporary instantiation. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed – in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “prophetic organization” (102) – may be crucial for the achievement of social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence.

#### The aff’s opposition to political organizing within the state dooms them to irrelevance. Affirmation produces catharsis, but cements inequality.

Smulewicz-Zucker 15 – Professor of Philosophy @ Baruch College CUNY

(Gregory, “The Treason of Intellectual Radicalism and the Collapse of Leftist Politics,” LOGOS, Winter edition)

Radical politics in contemporary western democracies finds itself in a state of crisis. When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is found wanting. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, radical theory has blossomed. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, new journals have emerged touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and sub-fields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts.

Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive, meaningful political, social, and cultural criticism of the kind that once made progressive and rational left political discourse relevant to the machinations of real politics and the broader culture. Today, leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity – from the workers movement to the Civil Rights movement – possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles.

Quite to the contrary, social movements have lost political momentum, they are generally focused on questions of culture, shallow discussions of class, and are generally obsessed with questions of identity divorced from the questions of material forms of oppression rather than on the great “social question” of unequal distributions of economic and political power which once served as the driving impulse for political, social and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and illusory visions of anarchic democracy, economic inequality has ballooned into oligarchic proportions, working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups are turned into a modern “coolie” labor force.

This has been the result, we contend, of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory. Further, we believe that this is the result of a transformation of ideas, that contemporary political theory on the left has witnessed a decisive shift in focus in recent decades – a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age. At a time when the left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, political discourse has become increasingly dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, post-colonialism, and other intellectual fads.

This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism, further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power rather than disrupting it. These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose.

The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to post-industrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others ought not to be a basic political imperative. To this end, what we would call a rational radical politics should seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics, but rather to enrich common goods, erode the great divisions of wealth and class, democratize all aspects of society and economy, and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community toward common ends. Indeed, only by widening the struggles of labor and re-thinking the ends of the labor movement – connecting the struggles labor to issues beyond the workplace, to education, the environment, public life, issues of racial and gender equality, culture and the nature of the social order more broadly – can we envision a revitalization of a worker’s movement, one that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals.[1]

But this is merely one fringe expression of what we see as a corrupted, simplified and de-politicized “new” radicalism. Once grounded in the Enlightenment impulse for progress, equality, rationalism, and the critical confrontation with asymmetrical power relations, the dominant trends of radical political thought now evade the concrete nature of these concerns. The battles that raged in the 1980s and 1990s between postmodernists and defenders of modernity – while serving as a harbinger of the contemporary split between the radical theorists divorced from reality and those who seek to establish anti-foundationalist conceptions of democratic discourse – were attached to a strong sense that the future of rationalism and radical politics hung in the balance. Today’s radical intellectuals do not feel compelled to defend their arguments or respond to their critics. Their purported radicalism becomes all the more opaque when the coherence of their claims is called into question. A concern for an exaggerated subjectivity, identity politics, anti-empirical theories of power, an obsession with “difference” – all serve to deplete the radical tradition of its potency. Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies, invent new forms of “subjectivity,” and concoct new languages of discourse that only serve to splinter forms of political resistance, consigning radicalism to the depths of incoherence and (academic success notwithstanding) political irrelevance.

### 1NC Ex Risk

#### Prioritize existential risk prevention---it encompasses AND outweighs other threats.

Dennis Pamlin & Stuart Armstrong 15, Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93, https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

2. Risks with infinite impact: A new category of risks “Most risk management is really just advanced contingency planning and disciplining yourself to realise that, given enough time, very low probability events not only can happen, but they absolutely will happen.” Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman Sachs CEO, July 2013 1 Risk = Probability × Impact Impacts where civilisation collapses to a state of great suffering and do not recover, or a situation where all human life end, are defined as infinite as the result is irreversible and lasts forever. A new group of global risks This is a report about a limited number of global risks – that can be identified through a scientific and transparent process – with impacts of a magnitude that pose a threat to human civilisation, or even possibly to all human life. With such a focus it may surprise some readers to find that the report’s essential aim is to inspire action and dialogue as well as an increased use of the methodologies used for risk assessment. The real focus is not on the almost unimaginable impacts of the risks the report outlines. Its fundamental purpose is to encourage global collaboration and to use this new category of risk as a driver for innovation. The idea that we face a number of global challenges threatening the very basis of our civilisation at the beginning of the 21st century is well accepted in the scientific community, and is studied at a number of leading universities.2 But there is still no coordinated approach to address this group of challenges and turn them into opportunities for a new generation of global cooperation and the creation of a global governance system capable of addressing the greatest challenges of our time. This report has, to the best of our knowledge, created the first science-based list of global risks with a potentially infinite impact and has made the first attempt to provide an initial overview of the uncertainties related to these risks as well as rough quantifications for the probabilities of these impacts. What is risk? Risk is the potential of losing something of value, weighed against the potential to gain something of value. Every day we make different kinds of risk assessments, in more or less rational ways, when we weigh different options against each other. The basic idea of risk is that an uncertainty exists regarding the outcome and that we must find a way to take the best possible decision based on our understanding of this uncertainty.3 To calculate risk the probability of an outcome is often multiplied by the impact. The impact is in most cases measured in economic terms, but it can also be measured in anything we want to avoid, such as suffering. At the heart of a risk assessment is a probability distribution, often described by a probability density function4; see figure X for a graphic illustration. The slightly tilted bell curve is a common probability distribution, but the shape differs and in reality is seldom as smooth as the example. The total area under the curve always represents 100 percent, i.e. all the possible outcomes fit under the curve. In this case (A) represents the most probable impact. With a much lower probability it will be a close to zero impact, illustrated by (B). In the same way as in case B there is also a low probability that the situation will be very significant, illustrated by (C). Figure 1: Probability density function [FIGURE 1 OMITTED] The impacts (A), (B) and (C) all belong to the same category, ~~normal~~ [common] impacts: the impacts may be more or less serious, but they can be dealt with within the current system. The impacts in this report are however of a special kind. These are impacts where everything will be lost and the situation will not be reversible, i.e challenges with potentially infinite impact. In insurance and finance this kind of risk is called “risk of ruin”, an impact where all capital is lost.5 This impact is however only infinite for the company that is losing the money. From society’s perspective, that is not a special category of risk. In this report the focus is on the “risk of ruin” on a global scale and on a human level, in the worst case this is when we risk the extinction of our own species. On a probability curve the impacts in this report are usually at the very far right with a relatively low probability compared with other impacts, illustrated by (D) in Figure 2. Often they are so far out on the tail of the curve that they are not even included in studies. For each risk in this report the probability of an infinite impact is very low compared to the most likely outcome. Some studies even indicate that not all risks in this report can result in an infinite impact. But a significant number of peer-reviewed reports indicate that those impacts not only can happen, but that their probability is increasing due to unsustainable trends. The assumption for this report is that by creating a better understanding of our scientific knowledge regarding risks with a potentially infinite impact, we can inspire initiatives that can turn these risks into drivers for innovation. Not only could a better understanding of the unique magnitude of these risks help address the risks we face, it could also help to create a path towards more sustainable development. The group of global risks discussed in this report are so different from most of the challenges we face that they are hard to comprehend. But that is also why they can help us to build the collaboration we need and drive the development of further solutions that benefit both people and the planet. As noted above, none of the risks in this report is likely to result directly in an infinite impact, and some are probably even physically incapable of doing so. But all are so significant that they could reach a threshold impact able to create social and ecological instability that could trigger a process which could lead to an infinite impact. For several reasons the potentially infinite impacts of the risks in this report are not as well known as they should be. One reason is the way that extreme impacts are often masked by most of the theories and models used by governments and business today. For example, the probability of extreme impacts is often below what is included in studies and strategies. The tendency to exclude impacts below a probability of five percent is one reason for the relative “invisibility” of infinite impacts. The almost standard use of a 95% confidence interval is one reason why low-probability high-impact events are often ignored.6 Figure 2: Probability density function with tail highlighted [FIGURE 2 OMITTED] Climate change is a good example, where almost all of the focus is on the most likely scenarios and there are few studies that include the low-probability high-impact scenarios. In most reports about climate impacts, the impacts caused by warming beyond five or six degrees Celsius are even omitted from tables and graphs even though the IPCC’s own research indicates that the probability of these impacts are often between one and five percent, and sometimes even higher.7 Other aspects that contribute to this relative invisibility include the fact that extreme impacts are difficult to translate into monetary terms, they have a global scope, and they often require a time-horizon of a century or more. They cannot be understood simply by linear extrapolation of current trends, and they lack historical precedents. There is also the fact that the measures required to significantly reduce the probability of infinite impacts will be radical compared to a business-as-usual scenario with a focus on incremental changes. The exact probability of a specific impact is difficult or impossible to estimate.8 However, the important thing is to establish the current magnitude of the probabilities and compare them with the probabilities for such impacts we cannot accept. A failure to provide any estimate for these risks often results in strategies and priorities defined as though the probability of a totally unacceptable outcome is zero. An approximate number for a best estimate also makes it easier to understand that a great uncertainty means the actual probability can be both much higher and much lower than the best estimate. It should also be stressed that uncertainty is not a weakness in science; it always exists in scientific work. It is a systematic way of understanding the limitations of the methodology, data, etc.9 Uncertainty is not a reason to wait to take action if the impacts are serious. Increased uncertainty is something that risk experts, e.g. insurance experts and security policy experts, interpret as a signal for action. A contrasting challenge is that our cultural references to the threat of infinite impacts have been dominated throughout history by religious groups seeking to scare society without any scientific backing, often as a way to discipline people and implement unpopular measures. It should not have to be said, but this report is obviously fundamentally different as it focuses on scientific evidence from peer-reviewed sources. Infinite impact The concept infinite impact refers to two aspects in particular; the terminology is not meant to imply a literally infinite impact (with all the mathematical subtleties that would imply) but to serve as a reminder that these risks are of a different nature. Ethical These are impacts that threaten the very survival of humanity and life on Earth – and therefore can be seen as being infinitely negative from an ethical perspective. No positive gain can outweigh even a small probability for an infinite negative impact. Such risks require society to ensure that we eliminate these risks by reducing the impact below an infinite impact as a top priority, or at least do everything we can to reduce the probability of these risks. As some of these risks are impossible to eliminate today it is also important to discuss what probability can right now be accepted for risks with a possible infinite impact. Economic Infinite impacts are beyond what most traditional economic models today are able to cope with. The impacts are irreversible in the most fundamental way, so tools like cost-benefit assessment seldom make sense. To use discounting that makes infinite impacts (which could take place 100 years or more from now and affect all future generations) close to invisible in economic assessments, is another example of a challenge with current tools. So while tools like cost-benefit models and discounting can help us in some areas, they are seldom applicable in the context of infinite impacts. New tools are needed to guide the global economy in an age of potential infinite impacts. See chapter 2.2.2 for a more detailed iscussion. Roulette and Russian roulette When probability and normal risks are discussed the example of a casino and roulette is often used. You bet something, then spin the wheel and with a certain probability you win or lose. You can use different odds to discuss different kinds of risk taking. These kinds of thought experiment can be very useful, but when it comes to infinite risks these gaming analogies become problematic. For infinite impact a more appropriate analogy is probably Russian roulette. But instead of “normal” Russian roulette where you only bet your own life you are now also betting everyone you know and everyone you don’t know. Everyone alive will die if you lose. There will be no second chance for anyone as there will be no future generations; humanity will end with your loss. What probability would you accept for different sums of money if you played this version of Russian roulette? Most people would say that it is stupid and – no matter how low the probability is and no matter how big the potential win is – this kind of game should not be played, as it is unethical. Many would also say that no person should be allowed to make such a judgment, as those who are affected do not have a say. You could add that most of those who will lose from it cannot say anything as they are not born and will never exist if you lose. The difference between ordinary roulette and “allhumanity Russian roulette” is one way of illustrating the difference in nature between a “normal” risk that is reversible, and a risk with an infinite impact. An additional challenge in acknowledging the risks outlined in this report is that many of the traditional risks including wars and violence have decreased, even though it might not always looks that way in media.10 So a significant number of experts today spend a substantial amount of time trying to explain that much of what is discussed as dangerous trends might not be as dangerous as we think. For policy makers listening only to experts in traditional risk areas it is therefore easy to get the impression that global risks are becoming less of a problem. The chain of events that could result in infinite impacts in this report also differ from most of the traditional risks, as most of them are not triggered by wilful acts, but accidents/mistakes. Even the probabilities related to nuclear war in this report are to a large degree related to inadvertent escalation. As many of the tools to analyse and address risks have been developed to protect nations and states from attacks, risks involving accidents tend to get less attention. This report emphasises the need for an open and democratic process in addressing global challenges with potentially infinite impact. Hence, this is a scientifically based invitation to discuss how we as a global community can address what could be considered the greatest challenges of our time. The difficulty for individual scientists to communicate a scientific risk approach should however not be underestimated. Scientists who today talk about low-probability impacts, that are serious but still far from infinite, are often accused of pessimism and scaremongering, even if they do nothing but highlight scientific findings.11 To highlight infinite impacts with even lower probability can therefore be something that a scientist who cares about his/her reputation would want to avoid. In the media it is still common to contrast the most probable climate impact with the probability that nothing, or almost nothing, will happen. The fact that almost nothing could happen is not wrong in most cases, but it is unscientific and dangerous if different levels of probability are presented as equal. The tendency to compare the most probable climate impact with the possibility of a low or no impact also results in a situation where low-probability high-impact outcomes are often totally ignored. An honest and scientific approach is to, whenever possible, present the whole probability distribution and pay special attention to unacceptable outcomes. The fact that we have challenges that with some probability might be infinite and therefore fundamentally irreversible is difficult to comprehend, and physiologically they are something our brains are poorly equipped to respond to, according to evolutionary psychologists.12 It is hard for us as individuals to grasp that humanity for the first time in its history now has the capacity to create such catastrophic outcomes. Professor Marianne Frankenhaeuser, former head of the psychology division, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, put it this way: “Part of the answer is to be found in psychological defence mechanisms. The nuclear threat is collectively denied, because to face it would force us to face some aspects of the world’s situation which we do not want to recognise.” 13 This psychological denial may be one reason why there is a tendency among some stakeholders to confuse “being optimistic” with denying what science is telling us, and ignoring parts of the probability curve.14 Ignoring the fact that there is strong scientific evidence for serious impacts in different areas, and focusing only on selected sources which suggest that the problem may not be so serious, is not optimistic. It is both unscientific and dangerous.15 A scientific approach requires us to base our decisions on the whole probability distribution. Whether it is possible to address the challenge or not is the area where optimism and pessimism can make people look at the same set of data and come to different conclusions. Two things are important to keep in mind: first, that there is always a probability distribution when it comes to risk; second, that there are two different kinds of impacts that are of interest for this report. The probability distribution can have different shapes but in simplified cases the shape tends to look like a slightly modified clock (remember figure 1). In the media it can sound as though experts argue whether an impact, for example a climate impact or a pandemic, will be dangerous or not. But what serious experts discuss is the probability of different oucomes. They can disagree on the shape of the curve or what curves should be studied, but not that a probability curve exists. With climate change this includes discussions about how sensitive the climate is, how much greenhouse gas will be emitted, and what impacts that different warmings will result in. Just as it is important not to ignore challenges with potentially infinite impacts, it is also important not to use them to scare people. Dramatic images and strong language are best avoided whenever possible, as this group of risks require sophisticated strategies that benefit from rational arguments. Throughout history we have seen too many examples when threats of danger have been damagingly used to undermine important values. The history of infinite impacts: The LA-602 document The understanding of infinite impacts is very recent compared with most of our institutions and laws. It is only 70 years ago that Edward Teller, one of the greatest physicists of his time, with his back-of-the-envelope calculations, produced results that differed drastically from all that had gone before. His calculations indicated that the explosion of a nuclear bomb – a creation of some of the brightest minds on the planet, including Teller himself – could result in a chain reaction so powerful that it would ignite the world’s atmosphere, thereby ending human life on Earth.16 Robert Oppenheimer, who led the Manhattan Project to develop the nuclear bomb, halted the project to see whether Teller’s calculations were correct.17 The resulting document, LA- 602: Ignition of the Atmosphere with Nuclear Bombs, concluded that Teller was wrong, But the sheer complexity drove them to end their assessment by writing that “further work on the subject [is] highly desirable”.18 The LA-602 document can be seen as the first scientific global risk report addressing a category of risks where the worst possible impact in all practical senses is infinite.19 Since the atomic bomb more challenges have emerged with potentially infinite impact. Allmost all of these new challenges are linked to the increased knowledge, economic and technical development that has brought so many benefits. For example, climate change is the result of the industrial revolution and development that was, and still is, based heavily on fossil fuel. The increased potential for global pandemics is the result of an integrated global economy where goods and services move quickly around the world, combined with rapid urbanisation and high population density. In parallel with the increased number of risks with possible infinite impact, our capacity to analyse and solve them has greatly increased too. Science and technology today provides us with knowledge and tools that can radically reduce the risks that historically have been behind major extinctions, such as pandemics and asteroids. Recent challenges like climate change, and emerging challenges like synthetic biology and nanotechnology, can to a large degree be addressed by smart use of new technologies, new lifestyles and institutional structures. It will be hard as it will require collaboration of a kind that we have not seen before. It will also require us to create systems that can deal with the problems before they occur. The fact that the same knowledge and tools can be both a problem and a solution is important to understand in order to avoid polarisation. Within a few decades, or even sooner, many of the tools that can help us solve the global challenges of today will come from fields likely to provide us with the most powerful instruments we have ever had – resulting in their own sets of challenges. Synthetic biology, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) are all rapidly evolving fields with great potential. They may help solve many of today’s main challenges or, if not guided in a benign direction, may result in catastrophic outcomes. The point of departure of this report is the fact that we now have the knowledge, economic resources and technological ability to reduce most of the greatest risks of our time. Conversely, the infinite impacts we face are almost all unintended results of human ingenuity. The reason we are in this situation is that we have made progress in many areas without addressing unintended low-probability high-impact consequences. Creating innovative and resilient systems rather than simply managing risk would let us focus more on opportunities. But the resilience needed require moving away from legacy systems is likely to be disruptive, so an open and transparent discussion is needed regarding the transformative solutions required. Figure 3: Probability density function with tail and threshold highlighted [FIGURE 3 OMITTED] 2.1 Report structure The first part of the report is an introduction where the global risks with potential infinite impact are introduced and defined. This part also includes the methodology for selecting these risks, and presents the twelve risks that meet this definition. Four goals of the report are also presented, under the headings “acknowledge”, “inspire”, “connect” and “deliver”. The second part is an overview of the twelve global risks and key events that illustrate some of the work around the world to address them. For each challenge five important factors that influence the probability or impact are also listed. The risks are divided into four different categories depending on their characteristics. “Current challenges” is the first category and includes the risks that currently threaten humanity due to our economic and technological development - extreme climate change, for example, which depends on how much greenhouse gas we emit. “Exogenic challenges” includes risks where the basic probability of an event is beyond human control, but where the probability and magnitude of the impact can be influenced - asteroid impacts, for example, where the asteroids’ paths are beyond human control but an impact can be moderated by either changing the direction of the asteroid or preparing for an impact. “Emerging challenges” includes areas where technological development and scientific assessment indicate that they could both be a very important contribution to human welfare and help reduce the risks associated with current challenges, but could also result in new infinite impacts.20 AI, nanotechnology and synthetic biology are examples. “Global policy challenge” is a different kind of risk. It is a probable threat arising from future global governance as it resorts to destructive policies, possibly in response to the other challenges listed above. The third part of the report discusses the relationship between the different risks. Action to reduce one risk can increase another, unless their possible links are understood. Many solutions are also able to address multiple risks, so there are significant benefits from understanding how one relates to others. Investigating these correlations could be a start, but correlation is a linear measure and non-linear techniques may be more helpful for assessing the aggregate risk. The fourth part is an overview, the first ever to our knowledge, of the uncertainties and probabilities of global risks with potentially infinite impacts. The numbers are only rough estimates and are meant to be a first step in a dialogue where methodologies are developed and estimates refined. The fifth part presents some of the most important underlying trends that influence the global challenges, which often build up slowly until they reach a threshold and very rapid changes ensue. The sixth and final part presents an overview of possible ways forward. 2.2 Goals Goal 1: Acknowledge That key stakeholders, influencing global challenges, acknowledge the existence of the category of risks that could result in infinite impact. They should also recognice that the list of risks that belong to this category should be revised as new technologies are developed and our knowledge increases. Regardless of the risks included, the category should be given special attention in all processes and decisions of relevance. The report also seeks to demonstrate to all key stakeholders that we have the capacity to reduce, or even eliminate, most of the risks in this category. Establish a category of risks with potentially infinite impact. Before anything significant can happen regarding global risks with potentially infinite impacts, their existence must be acknowledged. Rapid technological development and economic growth have delivered unprecedented material welfare to billions of people in a veritable tide of utopias.21 But we now face the possibility that even tools created with the best of intentions can have a darker side too, a side that may threaten human civilisation, and conceivably the continuation of human life. This is what all decision-makers need to recognise. Rather than succumbing to terror, we need to acknowledge that we can let the prospect inspire and drive us forward. Goal 2: Inspire That policy makers inspire action by explaining how the probabilities and impacts can be reduced and turned into opportunities. Concrete examples of initiatives should be communicated in different networks in order to create ripple effects, with the long-term goal that all key stakeholders should be inspired to turn these risks into opportunities for positive action. Show concrete action that is taking place today. This report seeks to show that it is not only possible to contribute to reducing these risks, but that it is perhaps the most important thing anyone can spend their time on. It does so by combining information about the risks with information about individuals and groups who has made a significant contribution by turning challenges into opportunities. By highlighting concrete examples the report hopes to inspire a new generation of leaders. Goal 3: Connect That leaders in different sectors connect with each other to encourage collaboration. A specific focus on financial and security policy where significant risks combine to demand action beyond the incremental is required. Support new meetings between interested stakeholders. The nature of these risks spans countries and continents; they require action by governments and politicians, but also by companies, academics, NGOs, and many other groups. The magnitude of the possible impacts requires not only leaders to act but above all new models for global cooperation and decision-making to ensure delivery. The need for political leadership is therefore crucial. Even with those risks where many groups are involved, such as climate change and pandemics, very few today address the possibility of infinite impact aspects. Even fewer groups address the links between the different risks. There is also a need to connect different levels of work, so that local, regional, national and international efforts can support each other when it comes to risks with potentially infinite impacts. Goal 4: Deliver That concrete strategies are developed that allow key stakeholders to identify, quantify and address global challenges as well as gather support for concrete steps towards a wellfunctioning global governance system. This would include tools and initiatives that can help identify, quantify and reduce risks with potentially infinite impacts. Identify and implement strategies and initiatives. Reports can acknowledge, inspire and connect, but only people can deliver actual results. The main focus of the report is to show that actual initiatives need to be taken that deliver actual results. Only when the probability of an infinite impact becomes acceptably low, very close to zero, and/or when the maximum impact is significantly reduced, should we talk about real progress. In order to deliver results it is important to remember that global governance to tackle these risks is the way we organise society in order to address our greatest challenges. It is not a question of establishing a “world government”, it is about the way we organise ourselves on all levels, from the local to the global. The report is a first step and should be seen as an invitation to all responsible parties that can affect the probability and impact of risks with potentially infinite impacts. But its success will ultimately be measured only on how it contributes to concrete results. 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact This chapter first introduces the concept of infinite impact. It then describes the methodology used to identify challenges with an infinite impact. It then presents risks with potentially infinite impact that the methodology results in. 2.3.1 Definition of infinite impact The specific criterion for including a risk in this report is that well-sourced science shows the challenge can have the following consequences: 22 1. Infinite impact: When civilisation collapses to a state of great suffering and does not recover, or a situation where all human life ends. The existence of such threats is well attested by science.23 2. Infinite impact threshold – an impact that can trigger a chain of events that could result first in a civilisation collapse, and then later result in an infinite impact. Such thresholds are especially important to recognise in a complex and interconnected society where resilience is decreasing.24 A collapse of civilisation is defined as a drastic decrease in human population size and political/economic/social complexity, globally for an extended time.25 The above definition means the list of challenges is not static. When new challenges emerge, or current ones fade away, the list will change. An additional criterion for including risks in this report is “human influence”. Only risks where humans can influence either the probability, the impact, or both, are included. For most risks both impact and probability can be affected, for example with nuclear war, where the number/size of weapons influences the impact and tensions between countries affects the probability. Other risks, such as a supervolcano, are included as it is possible to affect the impact through various mitigation methods, even if we currently cannot affect the probability. Risks that are susceptible to human influence are indirectly linked, because efforts to address one of them may increase or decrease the likelihood of another. 2.3.2 Why use “infinite impact” as a concept? The concept of infinity was chosen as it reflects many of the challenges, especially in economic theory, to addressing these risks as well as the need to question much of our current way of thinking. The concept of a category of risks based on their extreme impact is meant to provide a tool to distinguish one particular kind of risk from others. The benefit of this new concept should be assessed based on two things. First, does the category exist, and second, is the concept helpful in addressing these risks? The report has found ample evidence that there are risks with an impact that can end human civilisation and even all human life. The report further concludes that a new category of risk is not only meaningful but also timely. We live in a society where global risks with potentially infinite impacts increase in both number and probability according to multiple studies. Looking ahead, many emerging technologies which will certainly provide beneficial results, might also result in an increased probability of infinite impacts.26 Over the last few years a greater understanding of low probability or unknown probability events has helped more people to understand the importance of looking beyond the most probable scenarios. Concepts like “black swans” and “perfect storms” are now part of mainstream policy and business language.27 Greater understanding of the technology and science of complex systems has also resulted in a new understanding of potentially disruptive events. Humans now have such an impact on the planet that the term “the anthropocene” is being used, even by mainstream media like The Economist.28 The term was introduced in the 90s by the Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen to describe how humans are now the dominant force changing the Earth’s ecosystems.29 The idea to establish a well defined category of risks that focus on risks with a potentially infinite impact that can be used as a practical tool by policy makers is partly inspired by Nick Bostrom’s philosophical work and his introduction of a risk taxonomy that includes an academic category called “existential risks”.30 Introducing a category with risks that have a potentially infinite impact is not meant to be a mathematical definition; infinity is a thorny mathematical concept and nothing in reality can be infinite.31 It is meant to illustrate a singularity, when humanity is threatened, when many of the tools used to approach most challenges today become problematic, meaningless, or even counterproductive. The concept of an infinite impact highlights a unique situation where humanity itself is threatened and the very idea of value and price collapses from a human perspective, as the price of the last humans also can be seen to be infinite. This is not to say that those traditional tools cannot still be useful, but with infinite impacts we need to add an additional set of analytical tools. Life Value The following estimates have been applied to the value of life in the US. The estimates are either for one year of additional life or for the statistical value of a single life. – $50,000 per year of quality life (international standard most private and government-run health insurance plans worldwide use to determine whether to cover a new medical procedure) – $129,000 per year of quality life (based on analysis of kidney dialysis procedures by Stefanos Zenios and colleagues at Stanford Graduate School of Business) – $7.4 million (Environmental Protection Agency) – $7.9 million (Food and Drug Administration) – $6 million (Transportation Department) – $28 million (Richard Posner based on the willingness to pay for avoiding a plane crash) Source: Wikipedia: Value of life http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value\_of\_life US EPA: Frequently Asked Questions on Mortality Risk Valuation http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE%5Cepa%5Ceed.nsf/webpages/MortalityRiskValuation.html Posner, Richard A. Catastrophe: risk and response. Oxford University Press, 2004 Some of the risks, including nuclear war, climate change and pandemics, are often included in current risk overviews, but in many cases their possible infinite impacts are excluded. The impacts which are included are in most cases still very serious, but only the more probable parts of the probability distributions are included, and the last part of the long tail – where the infinite impact is found – is excluded.32 Most risk reports do not differentiate between challenges with a limited impact and those with a potential for infinite impact. This is dangerous, as it can mean resources are spent in ways that increase the probability of an infinite impact. Ethical aspects of infinite impact The basic ethical aspect of infinite impact is this: a very small group alive today can take decisions that will fundamentally affect all future generations. “All future generations” is not a concept that is often discussed, and for good reason. All through human history we have had no tools with a measurable global impact for more than a few generations. Only in the last few decades has our potential impact reached a level where all future generations can be affected, for the simple reason that we now have the technological capacity to end human civilisation. If we count human history from the time when we began to practice settled agriculture, that gives us about 12,000 years.33 If we make a moderate assumption that humanity will live for at least 50 million more years34 our 12,000-year history so far represents 1/4200, or 0.024%, of our potential history. So our generation has the option of risking everything and annulling 99.976% of our potential history. Comparing 0.024% with the days of a person living to 100 years from the day of conception, this would equal less than nine days and is the first stage of human embryogenesis, the germinal stage.35 Two additional arguments to treat potentially infinite impacts as a separate category are: 36 1. An approach to infinite impacts cannot be one of trial-and-error, because there is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damage, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Instead society must be proactive. This requires foresight to foresee new types of threat and willingness to take decisive preventative action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. 2. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, morality, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience of other sorts of risk. Infinite impacts are in a different category. Institutions and individuals may find it hard to take these risks seriously simply because they lie outside our experience. Our collective fear-response will probably be ill-calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Economic aspects of infinite impact and discounting In today’s society a monetary value is sometimes ascribed to human life. Some experts use this method to estimate risk by assigning a monetary value to human extinction.37 We have to remember that the monetary values placed on a human life in most cases are not meant to suggest that we have actually assigned a specific value to a life. Assigning a value to a human life is a tool used in a society with a limited supply of resources or infrastructure (ambulances, perhaps) or skills. In such a society it is impossible to save every life, so some trade-off must be made.38 The US Environmental Protection Agency explains its use like this: “The EPA does not place a dollar value on individual lives. Rather, when conducting a benefit-cost analysis of new environmental policies, the Agency uses estimates of how much people are willing to pay for small reductions in their risks of dying from adverse health conditions that may be caused by environmental pollution.” 39 The fact that monetary values for human lives can help to define priorities when it comes to smaller risks does not mean that they are suitable for quite different uses. Applying a monetary value to the whole human race makes little sense to most people, and from an economic perspective it makes no sense. Money helps us to prioritise, but with no humans there would be no economy and no need for priorities. Ignoring, or discounting, future generations is actually the only way to avoid astronomical numbers for impacts that may seriously affect every generation to come. In Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Richard Posner provides a cost estimate, based on the assumption that a human life is worth $50,000, resulting in a $300 tn cost for the whole of humanity, assuming a population of six billion. He then doubles the population number to include the value of all future generations, ending up with $600 tn, while acknowledging that “without discounting, the present value of the benefits of risk-avoidance measures would often approach infinity for the type of catastrophic risk with which this book is concerned.” 40 Discounting for risks that include the possibility of an infinite impact differs from risk discounting for less serious impacts. For example the Stern Review41 prompted a discussion between its chief author, Nicholas Stern, and William Nordhaus,42 each of whom argued for different discount levels using different arguments. But neither discussed a possible infinite climate impact. An overview of the discussion by David Evans of Oxford Brookes University highlighted some of the differing assumptions.43 Two things make infinite impacts special from a discounting perspective. First, there is no way that future generations can compensate for the impact, as they will not exist. Second, the impact is something that is beyond an individual preference, as society will no longer exist. Discounting is undertaken to allocate resources in the most productive way. In cases that do not include infinite impacts, discounting “reflects the fact that there are many high-yield investments that would improve the quality of life for future generations. The discount rate should be set so that our investable funds are devoted to the most productive uses.” 44 When there is a potentially infinite impact, the focus is no longer on what investments have the best rate of return, it is about avoiding the ultimate end. While many economists shy away from infinite impacts, those exploring the potentially extreme impacts of global challenges often assume infinite numbers to make their point. Nordhaus for example writes that “the sum of undiscounted anxieties would be infinite (i.e. equal to 1 + 1 +1 + … = ∞). In this situation, most of us would dissolve in a sea of anxiety about all the things that could go wrong for distant generations from asteroids, wars, out-of-control robots, fat tails, smart dust and other disasters.” 45 It is interesting that Nordhaus himself provides very good graphs that show why the most important factor when determining actions is a possible threshold (see below Figure 4 and 5). Nordhaus was discussing climate change, but the role of thresholds is similar for most infinite impacts. The first figure is based on traditional economic approaches which assume that Nature has no thresholds; the second graph illustrates what happens with the curve when a threshold exists. As Nordhaus also notes, it is hard to establish thresholds, but if they are significant all other assumptions become secondary. The challenge that Nordhaus does not address, and which is important especially with climate change, is that thresholds become invisible in economic calculations if they occur far into the future, even if it is current actions that unbalance the system and eventually push it over the threshold.46 Note that these dramatic illustrations rest on assumptions that the thresholds are still relatively benign, not moving us beyond tipping points which result in an accelerated release of methane that could result in a temperature increase of more than 8 °C, possibly producing infinite impacts.47 Calculating illustrative numbers By including the welfare of future generations, something that is important when their very existence is threatened, economic discounting becomes difficult. In this chapter, some illustrative numbers are provided to indicate the order of magnitude of the values that calculations provide when traditional calculations also include future generations. These illustrative calculations are only illustrative as the timespans that must be used make all traditional assumptions questionable to say the least. Still, as an indicator for why infinite impact might be a good approximation they might help. As a species that can manipulate our environment it could be argued that the time the human race will be around, if we do not kill ourselves, can be estimated to be between 1-10 million years – the typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species48 – and one billion years, the inhabitable time of Earth.49 [FIGURE 4 OMITTED] [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] If we assume – 50 million years for the future of humanity as our reference, – an average life expectancy of 100 years50, and – a global population of 6 billion people51 – all conservative estimate – , we have half a million generations ahead of us with a total of 3 quadrillion individuals. Assuming a value of $50,000 per life, the cost of losing them would then be $1.5 ×1020, or $150 quintillion. This is a very low estimate, and Posner suggests that maybe the cost of a life should be “written up $28 million” for catastrophic risks52. Posner’s calculations where only one future generation is included result in a cost of $336 quadrillion. If we include all future generations with the same value, $28 million, the result is a total cost of $86 sextillion, or $86 × 1021. This $86 sextillion is obviously a very rough number (using one billion years instead of 50 million would for example require us to multiply the results by 20), but again it is the magnitude that is interesting. As a reference there are about 1011 to 1012 stars in our galaxy, and perhaps something like the same number of galaxies. With this simple calculation you get 1022 to 1024, or 10 to 1,000 sextillion, stars in the universe to put the cost of infinite impacts when including future generations in perspective.53 These numbers can be multiplied many times if a more philosophical and technology-optimistic scenario is assumed for how many lives we should include in future generations. The following quote is from an article by Nick Bostrom in Global Policy Journal: “However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years. Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years.” 54 Likewise the value of a life, $28 million, a value that is based on an assessment of how individuals chose when it comes to flying, can be seen as much too small. This value is based on how much we value our own lives on the margin, and it is reasonable to assume that the value would be higher than only a multiplication of our own value if we also considered the risk of losing our family, everyone we know, as well as everyone else on the planet. In the same way as the cost increases when a certain product is in short supply, the cost of the last humans could be assumed to be very high, if not infinite. Obviously, the very idea to put a price on the survival of humanity can be questioned for good reasons, but if we still want to use a number, $28 million per life should at least be considered as a significant underestimation. For those that are reluctant or unable to use infinity in calculations and are in need of a number for their formulas, $86 sextillion could be a good initial start for the cost of infinite impacts. But it is important to note that this number might be orders of magnitude smaller than an estimate which actually took into account a more correct estimation of the number of people that should be included in future generations as well as the price that should be assigned to the loss of the last humans. 2.3.3 Infinite impact threshold (IIT) As we address very complex systems, such as human civilisation and global ecosystems, a concept as important as infinite impact in this report is that of infinity impact threshold. This is the impact level that can trigger a chain of events that results in the end of human civilisation. The infinite impact threshold (IIT) concept represents the idea that long before an actual infinite impact is reached there is a tipping point where it (with some probability) is no longer possible to reverse events. So instead of focusing only on the ultimate impact it is important to estimate what level of impact the infinity threshold entails. The IIT is defined as an impact that can trigger a chain of events that could result first in a civilisation collapse, and then later result in an infinite impact. Such thresholds are especially important to recognise in a complex and interconnected society where resilience is decreasing. Social and ecological systems are complex, and in most complex systems there are thresholds where positive feedback loops become self-reinforcing. In a system where resilience is too low, feedback loops can result in a total system collapse. These thresholds are very difficult to estimate and in most cases it is possible only to estimate their order of magnitude. As David Orrell and Patrick McSharry wrote in A Systems Approach to Forecasting: “Complex systems have emergent properties, qualities that cannot be predicted in advance from knowledge of systems components alone”. According to complexity scientist Stephen Wolfram’s principle of computational irreducibility, the only way to predict the evolution of such a system is to run the system itself: “There is no simple set of equations that can look into its future.” 55 Orrell and McSharry also noted that “in orthodox economics, the reductionist approach means that the economy is seen as consisting of individual, independent agents who act to maximise their own utility. It assumes that prices are driven to a state of near-equilibrium by the ‘invisible hand’ of the economy. Deviations from this state are assumed to be random and independent, so the price fluctuations are often modelled using the normal distribution or other distributions with thin tails and finite variance.” The drawbacks of an approach using the normal distribution, or other distributions with thin tails and finite variance, become obvious when the unexpected happens as in the recent credit crunch, when existing models totally failed to capture the true risks of the economy. As an employee of Lehman Brothers put it on August 11, 2007: “Events that models predicted would happen only once in 10,000 years happened every day for three days.” 56 [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] The exact level for an infinite impact threshold should not be the focus, but rather the fact that such thresholds exists and that an order of magnitude should be estimated.57 During the process of writing the report, experts suggested that a relatively quick death of two billion people could be used as a tentative number until more research is available.58 With current trends undermining ecological and social resilience it should be noted that the threshold level is likely to become lower as time progress. 2.3.4 Global F-N curves and ALARP In the context of global risks with potentially infinite impact, the possibility of establishing global F-N curves is worth exploring. One of the most common and flexible frameworks used for risk criteria divides risks into three bands: 59 1. Upper: an unacceptable/ intolerable region, where risks are intolerable except in extraordinary circumstances and risk reduction measures are essential. 2. Middle: an ALARP (“as low as reasonably practicable”) region, where risk reduction measures are desirable but may not be implemented if their cost is disproportionate to the benefit achieved. 3. Lower: a broadly acceptable/ negligible region, where no further risk reduction measures are needed. The bands are expressed by F-N curves. When the frequency of events which cause at least N fatalities is plotted against the number N on log–log scales, the result is called an F-N curve.60 If the frequency scale is replaced by annual probability, then the resultant curve is called an f-N curve. The concept for the middle band when using F-N curves is ALARP. It is a term often used in the area of safety-critical and safety-involved systems.62 The ALARP principle is that the residual risk should be as low as reasonably practicable. The upper band, the unacceptable/ intolerable region, is usually the area above the ALARP area (see figure 8) By using F-N curves it is also possible to establish absolute impact levels that are never acceptable, regardless of probability (Figure 7. Based on an actual F-n Curve showing an absolute impact level that is defined as unacceptable). This has been done in some cases for local projects. The infinite threshold could be used to create an impact limit on global F-N curves used for global challenges in the future. Such an approach would help governments, companies and researchers when they develop new technical solutions and when investing in resilience. Instead of reducing risk, such an approach encourages the building of systems which cannot have negative impacts above a certain level. Pros – Clearly shows relationship between frequency and size of accident – Allows judgement on relative importance of different sizes of accident – Slope steeper than -1 provides explicit consideration of multiple fatality aversion and favours concepts with lower potential for large fatality events – Allows company to manage overall risk exposure from portfolio of all existing and future facilities Cons – Cumulative expression makes it difficult to interpret, especially by non-risk specialists – Can be awkard to derive – May be difficult to use if criterion is exceeded in one area but otherwise is well below – Much debate about criterion lines Figure 7: Example of F-n curve showing different levels of risk 61 Figure 9: Pros and cons of F-N curves 63 46 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact practical guidance that can provide defined group of risks 2.3.5 A name for a clearly 10 100 1000 10000 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10-2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 Number of Fatalities (N) Frequency (F) of Accidents with N or More Fatalities (Per Year) ALARP region Unacceptable Acceptable Today no established methodology exists that provides a constantly updated list of risks that threaten human civilisation, or even all human life. Given that such a category can help society to better understand and act to avoid such risks, and better understand the relation between these risks, it can be argued that a name for this category would be helpful.65 To name something that refers to the end of humanity is in itself a challenge, as the very idea is so far from our usual references and to many the intuitive feeling will be to dismiss any such thing. The concept used in this report is “infinity”. The reson for this is that many of the challenges relate to discussed. In one way the name is not very important so long as people understand the impacts and risks associated with it. Still, a name is symbolic and can either help or make it more difficult to get support to establish the new category. The work to establish a list of risks with infinite impact evolved from “existential risk”, the philosophical concept that inspired much of the work to establish a clearly defined group of risks. The reason for not using the concept “existential risk and impact” for this category, beside the fact that existential impact is also used in academic contexts to refer to a personal impact, is that the infinite category is a smaller subset of “existential risk” and this new category is meant to be used as a tool, not a scientific concept. Not only should the impacts in the category potentially result in the end of all human life, it should be possible to affect the probability and/or impact of that risk. There must also exist an agreed methodology, such as the one suggested in this report, that decides what risks belong and not belong on the list. Another concept that the category relates to is “global catastrophic risk” as it is one of the most used concepts among academics interested in infinite impacts. However it is vague enough to be used to refer to impacts from a few thousand deaths to the end of human civilisation. Already in use but not clearly defined, it includes both the academic concept existential risks and the category of risks with infinite impacts. macroeconomics and its challenges in relation to the kind of impacts that the risks in this report focus on. Further, the name clearly highlights the unique nature without any normative judgements. Still, infinity is an abstract concept and it might not be best communicate the unique group of risks that it covers to all stakeholders. In the same way as it can be hard to use singularity to describe a black hole, it can be difficult to use infinity to describe a certain risk. If people can accept that it is only from a specific perspective that the infinity concept is relevant it could be used beyond the areas of macroeconomics. Two other concepts that also have been considered during the process of writing this report are “xrisks” and “human risk of ruin”. Xrisk has the advantage, and disadvantage, of not really saying anything at all about the risk. The positive aspect is that the name can be associated with the general concept of extinction and the philosophical concept of existential risk as both have the letter x in them. The disadvantage is the x often represents the unknown and can therefore relate to any risk. There is nothing in the name that directly relates to the kind of impacts that the category covers, so it is easy to interpret the term as just unknown risks. Human risk of ruin has the advantage of having a direct link to a concept, risk of ruin, that relates to a very specific state where all is lost. Risk of ruin is a concept in use in gambling, insurance, and finance that can all give very important contributions to the work with this new category of risk. The resemblance to an existing concept that is well established could be both a strength and a liability. Below is an overview of the process when different names were Figure 8: Example of F-n curve showing an absolute impact level that is defined as unacceptable/ infinite. i.e no level of probability is acceptable above a certain level of impact, in this case 1000 dead 64 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 47 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact 3. 2. 1. 9. Unacceptable risks in different combinations, e.g. unacceptable global risks – This is probably not appropriate for two main reasons. First, it is a normative statement and the category aims to be scientific; whether these risks are unacceptable or not is up to the citizens of the world to decide. Second, the idea of risk is that it is a combination of probability times impact. If a risk is unacceptable is therefore also usually related to how easy it is to avoid. Even if a risk is small, due to relatively low probability and relatively low impact, but is very easy to address, it can be seen as unacceptable, in the same way a large risk can be seen as acceptable if it would require significant resources to reduce. There will not be a perfect concept and the question is what concept can find the best balance between being easy to understand, acceptable where policy decisions needs to be made and also acceptable for all key groups that are relevant for work in these area. During the process to find a name for this category inspiration has been found in the process when new concepts have been introduced; from irrational numbers and genocide to sustainable development and the Human Development Index. So far “infinite risk” can be seen as the least bad concept in some areas and “xrisks” and “human risk of ruin” the least bad in others. The purpose of this report is to establish a methodology to identify a very specific group of risks as well as continue to a process where these risks will be addressed in a systematic and appropriate way. The issue of naming this group of risks will be left to others. The important is that the category gets the attention it deserves. The three concepts are very different. Global catastrophic risk is possibly the most used concept in contexts where infinite impacts are included, but it is without any clear definition. Existential risk is an academic concept used by a much smaller group and with particular focus on future technologies. The category in this report is a tool to help decision makers develop strategies that help reduce the probability that humanity will end when it can be avoided. The relation between the three concepts can be illustrated with three circles. The large circle (1) represents global catastrophic risks, the middle one (2) existential risks and the small circle (3) the list of twelve risks in this report, i.e. risks where there are peer reviewed academic studies that estimate the probability of an infinite impact and where there are known ways to reduce the risk. A list that could be called infinite risks, xrisks, or human risk of ruin. Other concepts that are related to infinite impacts that could potentially be used to describe the same category if the above suggestions are not seen as acceptable concepts are presented below, together with the main reason why these concepts were not chosen for this report. 1. Risk of ruin – is a concept in gambling, insurance and finance relating to the likelihood of losing all one’s capital or affecting one’s bankroll beyond the point of recovery. It is used to describe individual companies rather than systems.66 2. Extinction risk – is used in biology for any species that is threatened. The concept is also used in memory/cognition research. It is a very dramatic term, to be used with care. These factors make it probably unsuitable for use by stakeholders accustomed to traditional risk assessment. 3. Astronomical risk – is seldom used scientifically, but when it is used it is often used for asteroids and is probably best reserved for them.67 4. Apocalyptic risk – could have been suitable, as the original meaning is apocálypsis, from the Greek ἀπό and καλύπτω meaning ‘un-covering’. It is sometime used, but in a more general sense, to mean significant risks.68 But through history and today it is mainly used for a religious end of time scenario. Its strong links to unscientific doom-mongers make it probably unsuitable for a scientific concept. 5. End-of-the-world risk - belongs to the irrational doomsday narratives and so is probably unsuitable for scientific risk assessments. 6. Extreme risk – is vague enough to describe anything beyond the normal, so it is probably unsuitable for risk assessments of this magnitude. 7. Unique risk – is even vaguer, as every risk is unique in some way. Probably best avoided in risk assessments. 8. Collapse risk – is based on Jared Diamond’s thinking.69 There are many different kinds of collapse and only a few result in infinite impact. 48 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact Estimations of impact Only literature where there is some estimation of impact that indicates the possibility of an infinite impact is included. Leading organisations’ priorities In order to increase the probability of covering all relevant risks an overview of leading organisations' work was conducted. This list was then compared with the initial list and subjected to the same filter regarding the possibility to affect the probability or impact. Possibility of addressing the risk Possibility of addressing the risk: From the risks gathered from literature and organisations, only those where the probability or impact can be affected by human actions are included. Expert review Qualitative assessment: Expert review in order to increase the probability of covering all relevant global risks. List of risks Result: List of risks with potentially infinite impacts. Relevant literature Identification of credible sources: search relevant literature in academic literature included in World of Knowledge and Google Scholar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 This chapter presents the methodology used to identify global risks with potentially infinite impact. Methodology overview In order to establish a list of global risks with potentially infinite impact a methodological triangulation was used, consisting of: – A quantitative assessment of relevant literature. – A strategic selection of relevant organisations and their priorities. – A qualitative assessment with the help of expert workshops. 2.4 Methodology 70 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 49 2.4 Methodology The scientific review of literature was led by Seth Baum, Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute72 and research scientist at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University.73 The methodology for including global risks with a potentially infinite impact is based on a scientific review of key literature, with focus on peer-reviewed academic journals, using keyword search of both World of Knowledge74 and Google Scholar75 combined with existing literature overviews in the area of global challenges. This also included a snowball methodology where references in the leading studies and books were used to identify other scientific studies and books. In order to select words for a literature search to identify infinite impacts, a process was established to identify words in the scientific literature connected to global challenges with potentially infinite impacts. Some words generate a lot of misses, i.e. publications that use the term but are not the focus of this report. For example “existential risk” is used in business; “human extinction” is used in memory/cognition. Some search terms produced relatively few hits. For example “global catastrophic risk” is not used much. Other words are only used by people within a specific research community: few use “existential risk” in our sense unless they are using Nick Bostrom’s work. The term “global catastrophe” was identified as a phrase that referred almost exclusively to extremely negative impacts on humans, by a diversity of researchers, not just people in one research community. A list of 178 relevant books and reports was established based on what other studies have referred to, and/or which are seen as landmark studies by groups interviewed during the process. They were selected for a closer examination regarding the challenges they include.76 The full bibliography, even with its focus on publications of general interest, is still rather long. So it is helpful to have a shorter list focused on the highlights; the most important publications based on how often they are quoted, how wellspread the content (methodology, lists, etc.) is and how often key organisations use them. The publications included must meet at least one of the following criteria: – Historical significance. This includes being the first publication to introduce certain key concepts, or other early discussions of global challenges. Publications of historical significance are important for showing the intellectual history of global challenges. Understanding how the state of the art research got to where it is today can also help us understand where it might go in the future. – Influential in developing the field. This includes publications that are highly cited77 and those that have motivated significant additional research. They are not necessarily the first publications to introduce the concepts they discuss, but for whatever reason they will have proved important in advancing research. – State of the art. This includes publications developing new concepts at the forefront of global challenges research as well as those providing the best discussions of important established concepts. Reading these publications would bring a researcher up to speed with current research on global challenges. So they are important for the quality of their ideas. – Covers multiple global challenges (at least two). Publications that discuss a variety of global challenges are of particular importance because they aid in identifying and comparing the various challenges. This process is essential for research on global risks to identify boundaries and research priorities. In order to identify which global challenges are most commonly discussed, key surveys were identified and coded. First, a list of publications that survey at least three global challenges was compiled, and they were then scanned to find which challenges they discussed. The publications that survey many global challenges were identified from the full bibliography. Publications from both the academic and popular literature were considered. Emphasis was placed on publications of repute or other significance.78 To qualify as a survey of global challenges, the publication had to provide an explicit list of challenges or to be of sufficient length and breadth for it to discuss a variety of challenges. Many of the publications are books or book-length collections of articles published in book form or as special issues of scholarly journals. Some individual articles were also included because they discussed a significant breadth of challenges. A total of 40 global challenge survey publications were identified. For authors with multiple entries (Bostrom with three and WEF with ten) each challenge was counted only once to avoid bias. review of key literature 71 2.4.1 A scientific 50 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.4 Methodology 0 5 10 15 20 25 Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Biodiversity loss Asteroid / Comet / Meteor Volcano Genetic Engineering High Energy Physics Nanotech Resource Depletion Artificial Intelligence Chemical Pollution Ecological Catastrophe Biogeochem Government Failure Poverty System Failure Astronomic Explosion LULCC Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons Extraterrestrial Reject Procreation Computer Failure EM Pulse New Technology Ozone Depletion Dysgenics Ocean Acidification Interstellar Cloud Atmosphere Aerosols Phase Transition Simulation Unknown 21 18 17 15 14 14 13 13 13 13 11 11 11 8 8 8 8 7 7 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 In terms of authorship and audience, there are 17 academic publications, 9 popular publications, 1 government report, 3 publications written by academics for popular audiences. In terms of format, there are 15 books, 5 edited collections, 7 articles, 3 of miscellaneous format. Of the 40 publications identified, 22 were available at the time of coding. In addition, 10 Global Risks Reports from the World Economic Forum were coded and then gathered under one heading: “WEF Global Risk Report 2005-2014”. A list of 34 global challenges was developed based on the challenges mentioned in the publications. A spreadsheet containing the challenges and the publications was created to record mentions of specific challenges in each publication to be coded. Then each publication was scanned in its entirety for mentions of global challenges. Scanning by this method was necessary because many of the publications did not contain explicit lists of global challenges, and the ones that did often mentioned additional challenges separately from their lists. So it was not required that a global challenge be mentioned in a list for it to be counted – it only had to be mentioned somewhere in the publication as a challenge. Assessing whether a particular portion of text counts as a global challenge and which category it fits in sometimes requires some interpretation. This is inevitable for most types of textual analysis, or, more generally, for the coding of qualitative data. The need for interpretation in this coding was heightened by the fact that the publications often were not written with the purpose of surveying the breadth of global challenges, and even the publications that were intended as surveys did not use consistent definitions of global challenges. The coding presented here erred on the side of greater inclusivity: if a portion of text was in the vicinity of a global challenge, then it was coded as one. For example, some publications discussed risks associated with nuclear weapons in a general sense without specifically mentioning the possibility of large-scale nuclear war. These discussions were coded as mentions of nuclear war, even though they could also refer to single usages of nuclear weapons that would not rate as a global challenge. This more inclusive approach is warranted because many of the publications were not focused exclusively on global challenges. If they were focused on them, it is likely that they would have included these risks in their global challenge form (e.g., nuclear war), given that they were already discussing something related (e.g., nuclear weapons). Below are the results from the overview of the surveys. Figure 9: Number of times global challenges are included in surveys of global challenges Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 51 2.4 Methodology Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Biodiversity loss Asteroid / Comet / Meteor Volcano Genetic Engineering High Energy Physics Nanotech Resource Depletion Artificial Intelligence Chemical Pollution Ecological Catastrophe 21 18 17 15 14 14 13 13 13 13 11 11 11 0 25 20 15 10 5 dung beetle star trek zinc oxalate human extinction 0 200 400 600 800 1000 It should be noted that the literature that includes multiple global challenges with potentially infinite impact is very small, given the fact that it is about the survival of the human race. Experts in the field of global challenges, like Nick Bostrom, have urged policymakers and donors to focus more on the global challenges with infinite impacts and have used dramatic rhetoric to illustrate how little research is being done on them compared with other areas. However, it is important to note that many more studies exist that focus on individual global risks, but often without including low-probability high-impact outcomes.80 How much work actually exists on human extinction infinite impact is therefore difficult to assess. The list of risks found in the scientific literature was checked against a review of what challenges key organisations working on global challenges include in their material and on their webpages. This was done to ensure that no important risk was excluded from the list. The coding of key organisations paralleled the coding of key survey publications. Organisations were identified via the global catastrophic risk organisation directory published by the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute.82 They were selected from the directory if they worked on a variety of global challenges – at least three, and ideally more. The reason for focusing on those that work on multiple challenges is to understand which challenges they consider important and why. In contrast, organisations that focus on only one or two challenges may not Figure 10: The global challenges included ten times or more in surveys of global challenges on global challenges 81 organisations working 2.4.2 A review of Figure 11: Number of academic papers on various topics (listed in Scopus, August 2012) From the paper “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority” 79 52 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.4 Methodology Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Resource Depletion Biological Weapons Computer Failure Government Failure Nanotech Chemical Weapons Artificial Intelligence Genetic Engineering System Failure Biodiversity loss Ecological Failure Poverty Volcano Asteroid / Comet / Meteor Astronomic Explosion Biogeochem Chemical Pollution Extraterrestrial High Energy Physics New Technology Ozone Depletion Atmospheric Aerosols Dysgenics EM Pulse Interstellar Cloud LULCC Ocean Acidification Phase Transition Reject Procreation Simulation Unknown 13 13 12 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 12 2 6 10 14 be able to adjust their focus according to which challenges they consider the most important. The organisation coding used the same coding scheme developed for coding survey publications. References to specific global challenges were obtained from organisations’ websites. Many have web pages which list the topics they work on. Where possible, references to global challenges were pulled from these pages. Additional references to these challenges were identified by browsing other web pages, including recent publications. While it is possible that some of these organisations have worked on global challenges not mentioned on the web pages that were examined, overall the main challenges that they have worked on have probably been identified and coded. So the results should give a reasonably accurate picture of what global challenges these organisations are working on. Organisations working with global challenges were initially selected on the basis of the literature overview. A snowball sampling was conducted based on the list of organisations identified, according to whether they claimed to work on global challenges and/or their web page contained information about “existential risk”, “global catastrophic risk”,“human extinction” or “greatest global challenges”. Cross-references between organisations and input during the workshops were also used to identify organisations. An initial list of 180 organisations which work with global challenges was established. Based on the production of relevant literature, which other organisations referred to the organisation, and/or are seen as influential by groups interviewed during the process, a short-list of organisations were selected for a closer examination regarding the challenges they work with. Then those working with multiple challenges were selected, resulting in a list of 19 organisations.83 Below is the overview of the results from the overview of key organisations working with multiple global challenges. The organisations working on global challenges vary widely in: 1. What they count as a global challenge 2. How systematically they identify global challenges; and 3. Their emphasis on the most important global challenges For most organisations working with global challenges there are no explanations for the methodology used to select the challenges. Only a few thought leaders, like Tower Watson and their Extreme Risk Report 2013, have a framework for the challenges and estimates of possible impacts. Figure 12: Global challenges that key organisations work with Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 53 2.4 Methodology Climate Change Nuclear War Pandemic Resource Depletion Biological Weapons Computer Failure Government Failure Nanotech Chemical Weapons Artificial Intelligence Genetic Engeneering System Failure Atmospheric Aerosols 13 13 12 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 4 4 0 4 8 12 2 6 10 14 In most cases there is neither a definition of the impact, nor a definition of the probability. The report that focuses on global risk which is probably best known is the WEF Global Risk Report. The WEF’s risk work, with many other groups’, is probably best described as belonging to the category of risk perception rather than risk assessment, where experts are asked to estimate risks, but without any clear definition of probability or impact. The more serious organisations, like the WEF, also clearly define what they do as discussing perception of risk, not a scientific assessment of the actual risk. The WEF describes its perception methodology as follows: “This approach can highlight areas that are of most concern to different stakeholders, and potentially galvanise shared efforts to address them.” 85 The question which people are asked to answer is: “What occurrence causes significant negative impact for several countries and industries?” 86 The respondents are then asked to provide a number on two scales from 1-4, one for impact and another for likelihood (within 10 years).87 It is then up to the respondent to define what 1-4 means, so the major value of the report is to track the changes in perception over the years. Such perception approaches are obviously very interesting and, as the WEF states, can influence actual probability as the readers’ decisions will be influenced by how different challenges are perceived. Still, it is important to remember that the report does not provide an assessment of the actual probability (0-100%) or an assessment of the impact (and not the impact on human suffering, as many respondents likely define risk in monetary terms for their own company or country). An overview of WEF reports from the last ten years indicates that the challenges that likely could happen when applying a five year horizon, like the first signs of climate change, governmental failure and traditional pandemic, are identified. On the other hand, challenges which have very big impacts but lower probability, like extreme climate change, nanotechnology, major volcanoes, AI, and asteroids, tend to get less, or no, attention. An important question to explore is whether a focus on the smaller but still serious impacts of global challenges can result in an increased probability of infinite impacts. For example, there are reasons to believe that a focus on incremental adaptation instead of significant mitigation could be a problem for climate change as it could result in high-carbon lock-in.88 Other research indicates that focus on commercially relevant smaller pandemics could result in actions that make a major pandemic more likely. It is argued that this could happen, for example, by encouraging increased trade of goods while investing in equipment that scans for the type of pandemics that are known. Such a system can reduce the probability for known pandemics while at the same time resulting in an increased probability for new and more serious pandemics.89 Figure 13: The top 12 global challenges that key organisations work with 2.4.3 Workshops global risks 2.5 The list of Two workshops were arranged where the selection of challenges was discussed, one with risk experts in Oxford at the Future of Humanity Institute and the other in London with experts from the financial sector. See Appendix 2 for agenda and participants. In both workshops the list of global challenges was discussed to see if any additional challenges should be included, or if there were reasons to exclude some from the list. No challenge was excluded at the workshops, but one was added. Although little research exists yet that is able to verify the potential impacts, the participants agreed to include Global System Collapse as a risk with possible infinite impact. There was agreement that further research is needed to clarify exactly what parts of the economic and political system could collapse and result in a potentially infinite outcome. The conclusion was that enough research exists to include such a collapse on the list. Based on the risks identified in the literature review and in the review of organisations and applying the criteria for potentially infinite impact, these risks were identified: 1. Extreme Climate Change 2. Nuclear War 3. Global Pandemic 4. Ecological Catastrophe 5. Global System Collapse 6. Major Asteroid Impact 7. Supervolcano 8. Synthetic Biology 9. Nanotechnology 10. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 11. Unknown Consequences 12. Future Bad Global Governance This is an initial list. Additional risks will be added as new scientific studies become available, and some will be removed if steps are taken to reduce their probability90 and/or impact so that they no longer meet the criteria. Four categories of global challenges The challenges included in this report belong to four categories. The first, current challenges, includes those where decisions today can result directly in infinite impacts. They are included even if the time between action and impact might be decades, as with climate change. The second category is exogenous challenges, those where decisions do not – currently – influence probability, but can influence impact. The third category is emerging challenges, those where technology and science are not advanced enough to pose a severe threat today, but where the challenges will probably soon be able to have an infinite impact. The technologies included in emerging challenges, including synthetic biology, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI), will be critical to finding solutions to infinite impacts. Including these technologies should not be seen as an attempt to arrest them. If anything, the development of sustainable solutions should be accelerated. But it is equally important to create guidelines and frameworks to avoid their misuse, whether intentional or accidental. The fourth category, future global policy challenges, is of a different kind. It includes challenges related to the consequences of an inferior or destructive global governance system. This is especially important as well-intended actions to reduce global challenges could lead to future global governance systems with destructive impact. The first category, current challenges, includes: 1. Extreme Climate Change 2. Nuclear War 3. Global Pandemic 4. Ecological Catastrophe 5. Global System Collapse The second category, exogenous challenges, covers: 6. Major Asteroid Impact 7. Supervolcano Those in the third category, emerging challenges, are: 8. Synthetic Biology 9. Nanotechnology 10. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 11. Unknown Consequences The fourth category, global policy challenges, is: 12. Future Bad Global Governance not included 2.5.1 Risks Many risks could severely damage humanity but have not been included in this report. They were excluded for one or more of three reasons: 1. Limited impact. Many challenges can have significant local negative effects, without approaching the “2 billion negatively affected” criterion - tsunamis, for example, and chemical pollution. 2. No effective countermeasures. The report focuses on promoting effective interventions and so ignores challenges where nothing useful can be done to prevent or mitigate the impact, as with nearby gamma-ray bursts. 3. Included in other challenges. Many challenges are already covered by others, or have a damage profile so similar that there seemed no need to have a separate category. Population growth, for one, is an underlying driver significant for climate change and eco-system catastrophe, but without direct large-scale impacts. The challenges mentioned in the reviewed literature and organisations which are not included in this report often refer to economic damage such as “fiscal crises” or “unemployment”. While such impacts could have far-reaching consequences they are obviously of another magnitude than those included here. Some of the risks that were suggested and/or which exist in books and reports about global risks were rejected according to the criteria above. They include: 91 1. Astronomical explosion/nearby gamma-ray burst or supernova.92 These seem to be events of extremely low probability and which are unlikely to be survivable. Milder versions of them (where the source is sufficiently far away) may be considered in a subsequent report. ͢ Not included due to: No effective countermeasures 2. False vacuum collapse. If our universe is in a false vacuum and it collapses at any point, the collapse would expand at the speed of light destroying all organised structures in the universe.93 This would not be survivable. ͢ Not included due to: No effective countermeasures 3. Chemical pollution. Increasingly, there is particular concern about three types of chemicals: those that persist in the environment and accumulate in the bodies of wildlife and people, endocrine disruptors that can interfere with hormones, and chemicals that cause cancer or damage DNA. ͢ Not included due to: Limited impact 4. Dangerous physics experiments creating black holes/strangelets including high energy physics. These risks are of low probability94 and have been subsumed under “Uncertain Risks”. ͢ Not included due to: Included in other challenges 5. Destructive solar flares. Though solar flares or coronal mass ejections could cause great economic damage to our technological civilisation,95 they would not lead directly to mass casualties unless the system lacks basic resilience. They have been subsumed in the Global System Collapse category. ͢ Not included due to: Limited impact/included in other challenges 6. Moral collapse of humanity. Humanity may develop along a path that we would currently find morally repellent. The consequences of this are not clear-cut, and depend on value judgements that would be contentious and unshared.96 Some of these risks (such as global totalitarianism or enduring poverty) were included in the Governance Disasters category. ͢ Not included due to: included in other challenges 7. Resource depletion/LULCC/ Biodiversity loss. It has often been argued that declining resources will cause increased conflict.97 Nevertheless such conflicts would not be sufficient in themselves to threaten humanity on a large scale, without a “ System Collapse” or “Governance Disasters”. ͢ Not included due to: included in other challenge

### 1NC Turn

#### Growth is sustainable – Solves Climate Change

Henderson 20, John and Natty McArthur University Professor @ Harvard (Rebecca, May/June Issue, “The Unlikely Environmentalists: How the Private Sector Can Combat Climate Change,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/unlikely-environmentalists)

There’s a reason climate change is often described as a “wicked problem.” Fully decarbonizing the economy will require not only completely transforming the global energy infrastructure, at a cost of many trillions of dollars, but also retrofitting all of the world’s buildings, remaking the planet’s agricultural practices, and revolutionizing transportation systems. It is difficult to see how this can be accomplished without some kind of global carbon tax or regulatory regime. But putting such a system in place is proving to be enormously difficult. The 2015 Paris agreement on climate change was a good first step, but many countries show little sign of meeting the commitments they made as part of that agreement, and the United States’ withdrawal from the process has presented a significant barrier to further progress. Given the slowing global economy and the slide toward populism and nationalism in much of the world, the prospects for any kind of comprehensive global accord seem increasingly remote. So far, at least, the public sector is failing to confront the problem.

But the private sector has begun to step in to fill the vacuum. In January, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the largest asset manager in the world, declared that “climate risk is investment risk” and announced that going forward BlackRock would ask every firm in its portfolio to disclose its carbon emissions. BlackRock has roughly $7 trillion under management and is one of the largest shareholders in nearly every publicly traded firm in the world. So companies around the world paid attention when Fink went on to say that BlackRock would consider voting against boards whose firms “do not make sufficient progress” in addressing climate-related risks and would cease to invest altogether in some fossil fuel projects.

Fink is not alone. Many of the world’s largest asset owners are coming to the conclusion that climate change is the most important risk to the long-term health of their portfolios. More than a third of global invested capital—about $19 trillion—is controlled by the world’s 100 largest asset owners. Nearly two-thirds of this money is in pension funds; the remaining third is in sovereign wealth funds. These funds are now so large that they are sometimes referred to as “universal owners” or “universal investors” since, in effect, they hold the entire market. For that reason, they cannot diversify away from the risk of climate change—a risk that Mark Carney, who until earlier this year was the governor of the Bank of England, suggested could result in an abrupt financial collapse, potentially wiping out as much as $20 trillion of assets. To avert that kind of calamity, major asset owners are starting to push the companies in their portfolios to address climate change.

This trend is not driven by altruism or a deep commitment to the environment: it’s a function of economic interests. For the world’s largest asset owners, climate change is not an externality—it is a profound threat to their long-term returns. It will, after all, be significantly harder to make money in a world where most of the major ports are underwater, harvests are failing on a routine basis, and hundreds of millions of people are on the move.

As more and more major asset owners come to this realization, it is creating increasingly strong incentives for them to cooperate with one another in support of large-scale decarbonization. Together, they are pressing the firms in their portfolios to set concrete targets for emission reductions and to make progress toward meeting those targets, potentially solving the problem posed by firms’ unwillingness to cut their emissions unless they can be assured that their competitors will follow suit. Someone, however, will need to monitor that progress and sanction firms that lag behind—a role that would be best filled by government regulators. The need for such public-sector involvement will likely increase private-sector support for the policy changes required to drastically reduce carbon emissions. In this way, private-sector pressure may serve as the force that finally breaks the political logjam that has long blocked the public action needed to solve the climate crisis.

MONEY TALKS

One of the most promising examples of what this might look like in practice is Climate Action 100+, a nonprofit affiliation of more than 300 investors who collectively control nearly half of the world’s invested capital. The group was founded in 2017 with the goal of persuading the world’s 100 largest private-sector carbon emitters to “cut the financial risk associated with catastrophe” by putting in place board-level processes to assess their climate-related risks and oversee plans for dealing with them, pledging to clearly disclose those risks, and taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across their value chains rapidly enough to help meet the Paris agreement’s goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to well below two degrees Celsius.

In December 2018, a group of investors belonging to Climate Action 100+ published a letter in the Financial Times listing some specific steps they were demanding of companies in which they invest, including “the rapid elimination of coal use by utilities in EU and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries by no later than 2030.” Six months later, investors from the consortium pushed the oil giant Shell to announce short-term targets for limiting its greenhouse gas emissions and persuaded BP to support a shareholder resolution that binds the oil company to disclose the carbon intensity of its products, the methodology it uses to consider the climate impact of new investments, and its plans for setting and measuring emission targets. More than half of the 40 oil and gas companies with which the group has engaged have set long-term quantitative targets for reducing their emissions. And the group has helped persuade the shipping giant Maersk and two of the world’s largest mining companies, ArcelorMittal and Thyssenkrupp, to commit to becoming carbon neutral by 2050.

These kinds of commitments are sometimes dismissed as mere greenwashing: public relations stunts designed to buy time. And sometimes they are. But they might also help catalyze an economic transformation that could play a major role in arresting climate change.

Of course, large asset holders are not the only players who shape a company’s incentives: employees and consumers do, as well, and they are increasingly insisting that firms go green—and rewarding them when they do. For example, after the consumer goods giant Unilever announced that it planned to cut its carbon footprint in half and double its revenue at the same time—and then followed through by transforming its operations, brand by brand—the firm joined Facebook, Google, and Microsoft on LinkedIn’s list of the ten most desirable employers in the world. Sales of Unilever’s “sustainable living” brands—which include Ben & Jerry’s, Dove, and Vaseline and which Unilever claims “contribute to achieving the company’s ambition of halving its environmental footprint”—are growing 69 percent faster than the rest of the business and providing 75 percent of the company’s growth.

Shifting public attitudes about climate change and public policies intended to combat it have also created clear business opportunities. Solar and wind energy are both multibillion-dollar businesses. The market for plant-based alternatives to meat is exploding. And global recycling could generate close to $400 billion in the next five years.

RISKY BUSINESS

But embracing the innovation that is required to exploit new opportunities is often risky and expensive. The venture capital industry lost at least $10 billion between 2005 and 2011 investing in clean energy technology. An electric utility that commits to phasing out coal plants might reap the benefits of declining solar and wind energy costs, but it could also misjudge the market and significantly increase its costs. An automobile company that invests in developing electric vehicles might leap ahead of its competitors, but it could also risk losing out to more cautious rivals.

Universal investors can help mitigate those risks by funneling capital to firms that are willing to make the first move. This can be transformational in itself, since companies that decide to embrace new opportunities can often persuade an entire industry to follow them. Walmart’s massive investments in energy saving and waste reduction, for example, have helped persuade many other companies to take similar steps. Since 2010, the price of battery storage has fallen by at least 73 percent, a change driven largely by the electric vehicle company Tesla’s significant investments in the technology, which spurred the company’s competitors to invest more than $90 billion in the development of electric vehicles.

Major asset holders can also push companies to commit to aggressive targets for decarbonizing their business models and insist that they report on their progress. In this way, universal investors may be able to force every firm in an industry to act, solving the collective action problem inherent in tackling climate change. Firms don’t naturally act collectively—for all kinds of reasons, including antitrust law. But when there exists a clear business case for doing so and cooperation can be credibly enforced, voluntary cooperation can be an effective means of creating or preserving public goods. Nearly half of the world’s inshore fisheries are managed through some form of cooperative agreement. Most of the rules governing international trade are designed and enforced by the International Chamber of Commerce, a voluntary association founded in 1919.

Some of the world’s largest firms are increasingly exploring whether these kinds of voluntary agreements might be an effective way to reduce emissions. For example, after Unilever came under pressure from activists to stop using palm oil, the cultivation of which contributes to deforestation, Paul Polman, who was then the company’s CEO, was able to persuade many of his fellow consumer goods CEOs that continuing to purchase conventionally produced palm oil presented a significant threat to their own brands. Partly as a result, more than 60 percent of the world’s traded palm oil is now covered by sustainability commitments. Similar agreements with respect to soy and beef have greatly slowed rates of deforestation in the Amazon River basin. And companies in industries as diverse as airlines, food, retail, apparel, travel, hospitality, construction, health care, and high technology have begun to coordinate to reduce carbon emissions across supply chains, so that no single firm is placed at a disadvantage by going green.

Such arrangements produce a wealth of knowledge about what effective decarbonization might look like on the ground. As one might expect, however, they are often unstable and difficult to enforce, since no mechanism exists through which to punish firms that drag their feet or refuse to conform. Here, universal investors might be able to make a significant difference by acting as enforcers. If BlackRock, for example, follows through on its threat to vote against the boards of companies that do not adequately disclose their climate emissions, every major firm in every industry will be forced to report—in an auditable, replicable way—the degree to which it is meeting its commitments. And if the world’s major investors then vote against the boards of those companies that are falling behind, investors could catalyze the transformation of entire industries.

THE EARTH LOBBY

Arresting climate change will still require government action, of course, and the changes afoot in finance and the corporate world could ease the path. As firms commit to reducing their carbon emissions, they are increasingly recognizing that the most effective way to ensure that they are not undercut by lagging companies is to press for regulation. Together, they are creating a constituency for effective climate policy.

In 2017, for example, when U.S. President Donald Trump declared that he was going to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement, the CEOs of more than 50 U.S. companies, including Apple, Gap, Google, HP, and Levi Strauss, published an open letter urging him to rethink the decision. When Trump stuck to his plan, Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, and Bob Iger, then the CEO of Disney, resigned from some of the president’s advisory councils in protest. More than 2,000 companies have joined a collaborative effort called “We Are Still In,” a group working to ensure that the United States meets its commitments under the agreement despite the administration’s withdrawal. The group includes not only businesses but also states, cities, religious organizations, and universities. Together, they represent 68 percent of U.S. GDP, 65 percent of the U.S. population, and the source of more than half of all U.S. carbon emissions. Such action independent of the federal government could make a big difference. According to America’s Pledge, a nongovernmental organization that tracks local progress toward emission reductions, the “full achievement of already on-the-books policies from state and local actors—paired with rapidly shifting economics in the power sector—would reduce emissions 19 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and 25 percent below 2005 levels by 2030.” This would be a significant step toward the approximately 50 percent reduction in emissions that the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates is necessary to avoid the most dangerous potential outcomes of climate change.

These efforts and others like them also have the potential to change the nature of the political conversation around climate change. In an increasingly partisan world, firms occupy a unique position. According to the 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, an annual survey measuring credibility and trust, business is now the world’s most trusted institution, and 71 percent of employees around the world agree that “it is critically important” for the CEOs of their companies “to respond to challenging times.” A broad-based movement among the world’s biggest companies to tackle climate change could help legitimate the idea that climate change is a real danger, that acting to avert it could be a major driver of innovation and economic growth, and that appropriate public policy could be enormously helpful.

Such a movement could also put increasing pressure on companies that resist decarbonizing. One of the reasons that climate regulation has stalled in the United States is that a small minority of firms have invested billions of dollars in actively lobbying against it. If their peers start to push for regulation and highlight the dangers inherent in continuing with business as usual, those laggards will be compelled to change their behavior. One day soon, flooding the political process with money to defend the burning of fossil fuels could be seen as an unacceptable reputational risk—or even as morally indefensible.

For many years, experts have assumed that the fastest and most efficient route to global decarbonization is coordinated state action. But as the world’s political institutions have come under pressure, such action has become increasingly elusive. Against this background, the growing understanding that climate change presents a profound threat to the long-term returns of the world’s largest asset owners provides some reason for hope. As investors push for change and the realization dawns in more and more boardrooms that the benefits of climate action will outweigh the costs, it is possible that leading-edge firms could trigger a cascade of reinforcing reforms, transforming the economics of individual industries and creating a significant constituency for political action. For decades, when it came to addressing climate change, large asset holders and big companies acted more as obstacles than as catalysts. Those days may soon be over.

#### Warming is existential

Ng ’19 [Yew-Kwang; May 2019; Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technology University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of the Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Economics from Sydney University; Global Policy, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism,” vol. 10, no. 2, p. 258-266; RP]

Catastrophic climate change

Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non‐linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7

A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global warming, including:

* the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming;
* the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and
* higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming.

Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’.

The threat of sea‐level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet‐bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could … expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low.

While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that we cannot rule it out. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] … to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and the resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by literally a trillion times.

#### Global- Supply chains are good: Stop war and ending them hurts other countries the most

Wolf ‘20

(Martin Wolf is chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, London. “The dangerous war on supply chains” June 23, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/e27b0c0c-1893-479b-9ea3-27a81c2506c9)**AB**

“One of the things that this crisis has taught us, sir, is that we are dangerously overdependent on a global supply chain for our medicines, like penicillin; our medical supplies, like masks; and our medical equipment, like ventilators.” Thus, did Peter Navarro, an influential adviser of US president Donald Trump, draw lessons from the Covid-19 crisis for American trade policy. The dangerous war on supply chains Protectionism in a crisis only concentrates risk domestically and diminishes economies of scale This view is seductive to protectionists. But it is wrong. The lesson from the crisis is to be better prepared. Self-sufficiency in “essential products” would not be a good way to achieve this. On the contrary, it would be a costly error. Attacks on cross-border supply chains should not be viewed in isolation. The latest forecasts from the World Trade Organization suggest that the collapse in trade now could be far bigger than in response to the 2008 financial crisis. It would be very damaging if policymakers responded to the steep decline in their countries’ exports by curbing imports. Yet that is what forced “reshoring” of supply chains means. It would be yet another assault on liberal trade. (See charts.) Covid-19 brought forth a wave of export restrictions instead. The products covered by these prohibitions and restrictions vary. But most of them focused on medical supplies (face masks and shields, for example) and pharmaceuticals and medical equipment (ventilators, for example). These restrictions are legal. But that does not make them wise. In a collection of essays on Covid-19 and Trade Policy, Richard Baldwin of the Graduate Institute in Geneva and Simon Evenett of St Gallen ask: “Should governments react to the health, economic, and trade crises by turning inward?” The answer is: No. “Turning inward won’t help today’s fight against Covid-19 . . . Trade is not the problem; it is part of the solution.” Remember that the problem was not with trade, but rather with a lack of supply.

Export restrictions merely reallocate the shortages, by shifting them on to countries with the least capacity. A natural response to this experience is for every country to try to be self-sufficient in every product that might turn out to be relevant. That is what Mr Navarro suggests the US should do. Yet businesses would then lose economies of scale, as global markets fragmented. Their capacity to invest in innovation would be reduced. Only the largest and most advanced economies could plausibly seek self-sufficiency in such a wide range of technologies. For all others, this would be a dead end. More relevant, self-sufficiency is not at all a guarantee of greater security. In his chapter in the book edited by Profs Baldwin and Evenett, Sébastien Miroudot of the OECD distinguishes helpfully between “resilience” and “robustness”. The former refers to the ability to return to normal operations after a disruption; the latter to the ability to maintain operations during a crisis. In a pandemic, the latter is probably the more relevant. It is necessary to have access to essential supplies in a pandemic, though it is also necessary to be able to restore production quickly if some of it is disrupted. The obvious way to achieve robustness is to diversify suppliers across multiple locations. Producing in one’s own country is not a guarantee of robustness. Any given location might be affected by a pandemic, hurricane, earthquake, flood, strikes, civil unrest or even war. To put every egg in one basket, even the domestic one, is risky. Robustness in supply can thus be achieved through a mixture of a multiplicity of suppliers with holding stocks of essential products. The possibility of importing increases the potential number of suppliers and possibly the access to surplus stocks, too. Protection, however, concentrates risk domestically, reduces the diversity of potential suppliers and diminishes the pressure of competition and economies of scale. So far, global supply chains in health products have turned out to be robust. Mr Miroudot notes the ability of South Korea to supply Covid-19 test kits globally. He argues that its ability to expand supply quickly “requires international networks, skilled supply chain managers, reactivity, and agility. This type of experience simply does not come from local production and activities shielded from competition.” So what would a sensible policy look like? There would be national and global efforts to identify essential products in the event of various emergencies. There would then be monitoring of relevant supply chains and inventories, both domestic and global. To achieve this, one would need respected and well-funded national and global bodies working alongside private industry. This should be viewed as a fundamental security concern. The pandemic has, after all, posed a vastly greater threat to security than the military threats governments have been spending trillions of dollars to contain. In the course of such an effort, countries might seek to identify potential vulnerability to supplies from particular partners. Mutual vulnerability can be a source of stability. But countries might regard some sources as too risky. Yet a shift of supply back home need not be the response. Other possibilities exist. Trade is a vital part of the global response to a pandemic, including the creation and distribution of the vaccine we need. Trade must also remain a large part of the global economy more broadly. The ability to trade freely augments the diversity, and even reliability, of supply. It also creates a big opportunity. Covid-19 may indeed reverse the integration of production of past decades. We will regret it greatly if it does.

# 2NC

### 2NC- AT: Top Down

#### their author says policymaking is key.

**Aboyomi Al-Ameen, 14** - Visiting Research Fellow British Institute of International and Comparative Law (Antitrust: The Person-centered Approach, pgs v-vi)

The thesis develops the conceptual basis for the pursuit of “justice as inclusiveness”. To achieve this, it recognises the need to deemphasise the normative content of antitrust theories and practices. The thesis recognises that to achieve the inclusiveness sought, antitrust analysis must adhere to the principles of pure procedural justice whilst also remaining intelligible and functional for policymaking, adjudication, and enforcement. To achieve this, the person-centred approach identifies the requirement of broadness as an essential condition. However, in order to avoid conceptual absurdities, the scope of the person-centred account of broadness is clearly delineated.

It must be noted that rather than seeking to build a conclusive theory of antitrust (which might fall short as being incomplete and mistaken), the person-centred approach simply states a perspective which gives a broader outlook on antitrust in order to accommodate a variety of interests held or that can be held by different persons.

### 2NC- TVA

#### TVA: Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct related to firm exemption and co-ordination rights .

#### Solves capitalism and allows for discussions of racialized capitalism

Marshall Steinbaum et al 20, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Utah, Left Anchor, podcast episode 155: “Socialism vs. Antitrust with Marshall Steinbaum,” 9/12/20, transcribed by Otter, https://leftanchor.podbean.com/e/episode-155-socialism-vs-antitrust-with-marshall-steinbaum/

Marshall Steinbaum 31:39 But yeah, I mean, there's a kind of what you were saying, I definitely agree with that, I guess I would push back a little bit on the kind of interpretation of the states moving away. And so like, the only thing that matters is what whether Tim Cook allows Uber to make a living, as opposed to whether, you know, the taxing authorities of every city and their state labor departments and the FTC FTC have a say on it. Like they're, they're, you know, small potatoes in comparison to the CEO of some company. I think I mean, that's true about, you know, who wields power in the economy. But it's not right to say that that's because the state has retreated and sort of ceded all control to, to the capitalist, I think we have to understand the state's involvement or policies involvement as being, you know, kind of inescapable. So the question is like, okay, so you've got, you know, like, incorporation statutes, like who's allowed to be a company to enjoy limited liability or whatever, like, people don't think of that as being part of economic policy. But it absolutely is not just, you know, is Apple allowed to be a corporation or not a corporation as, as you know, say it's a California Corporation? I mean, it's probably a Delaware Corporation, but whatever, you know, can it operate across state lines? You know, these were big issues in the 19th century. Nowadays, we get things like, oh, if you're a corporation, then basically anything you want to do is legal under the antitrust laws, you know, but people who are not corporations cannot act together under the antitrust laws. So for example, you know, you're talking about like, oh, Uber could be liable under antitrust for this gigantic price fixing conspiracy. Through, executed through verticals restraints, yes. You know, who has actually been found to be liable under the antitrust laws? Uber drivers for potentially collectively bargaining their wages against Uber. So that it's this idea that like, Oh, you know, these individual drivers, like they're independent businesses operating on this neutral platform, but they can't get together. That's what the antitrust laws forbid. Whereas this one gigantic corporation that dominates them that is absolutely allowed to do whatever it wants. So this is the kind of concept that my my colleague and collaborator Sanjukta Paul is called the allocator, antitrust is an allocator of coordination rights and the title of her paper. This idea is like, who's allowed to coordinate economic activity? Is it it, and what she says is that antitrust has what's called the firm exemption. So here she's drawing on what what, you know, most every antitrust person recognizes and is known in the jurisprudence is the labor exemption, which is that labor unions bargaining wages within a recognized bargaining framework cannot violate the antitrust law through that collective bargaining. So that the idea is that's an exemption to antitrust's usual, preference for competition. What she says is, you know, we have to reinterpret that as being, as there being a firm exemption to antitrust, which is Uber telling everybody what to do, that has an exemption from antitrust law by virtue of the fact that Uber is a corporation and or the way that we have chosen to allocate coordination rights in her framework is to allow Uber to coordinate entire markets in the case of Apple to allow Apple to determine what is presented on its on its app store and you know, it has, you know, pretty, you know, strong representation in the retail smartphone market. So it's like okay, you know, Uber is probably going for relative upscale clientele, they all have iPhones, if it can't get on the iPad, if it can't get on the App Store can't get on the iPhone. And if you can't get on the iPhone, they have no business. You know, that is the allocation of coordination rights over that market to Apple, as opposed to some other mechanism for allocating coordination rights. And this is where, you know, to get back to what we were talking about earlier, anti monopolist framework would say, you know, there's no reason why Apple gets to be the one who decides who sees what, why don't we potentially, you know, in a kind of Co Op context, give, give that right to, you know, a consortium or, you know, quote unquote, union of app developers, or in the case of, say, ride sharing, like, why don't we have a union of taxi drivers, and they determine, you know, who gets who gets matched with which customer and what the fare is, as opposed to the company determining thatAlexi 35:48 this is so important, and I think it's really worth emphasizing, you know, the point about how jurisprudence and an antitrust enforcement does what she said, and so far as it, it chooses sides, and who can coordinate these things and who's autonomous and who has power. And since we're speaking of Apple, maybe you can talk a bit about how sanitation workers right at Kodak, Kodak back in the 80s had more power to coordinate and kind of exert their their power over sanitation workers at Apple, right in contemporary times, and then you write about how that is kind of an example of, you know, how the separation of workers from lead firms is kind of a simultaneous erosion of the in the jurisprudence of the Sherman act prohibitions on vertical restraints. So, yeah, maybe talk even a bit more about about the importance of this. Marshall Steinbaum 36:40 Yeah, so that's getting to what a great economist David Weil has called the fissured workplace. And I think you're referring specifically to a article that was published, I think, by Neil Irwin, if I recall, correctly, in the New York Times, a couple years ago, that was profiling two specific people, one of whom had been kind of janitorial worker on payroll at Kodak in the early 80s. And like, she had basically benefited from their, you know, corporate policies that included incentives to like go to community college and get credentials. And so she got qualified as I you know, sort of IT person, she was like, trained on Lotus 123, or something from the, you know, from the dark history of personal computing. You know, she kind of worked her way up through the ranks at Kodak, thanks to the fact that she started in the ranks of Kodak that is that she was a janitorial worker on the payroll, she was able to be promoted, basically, to the point of being the head of it for the entire company at some at one point. So she was a senior executive, you know, and that kind of social mobility via the mechanism of a major economy leading firm that employs people kind of every stratum of the occupational hierarchy of the income hierarchy, and is itself a like, somewhat egalitarian organization in its own right. I mean, insofar as any corporation could be egalitarian within capitalism, you know, I think this is kind of what Wynand was talking about, when he referred to, you know, this sort of New Deal state that was created by the National Labor Relations Act and other other, you know, kind of New Deal reforms, it's like that, that kind of somewhat egalitarian corporate organization is, you know, a thing of the past. And my argument would be well, it's and it's the erosion of antitrust that made that not the case. So in the instance of Apple, the contrary, the contrasting individual was, you know, janitorial services worker who was contracted, so she was employed by some, you know, janitorial services contractor whom Apple contracted with to clean its offices, but like, there's no way that she's ever going to be promoted to be an employee of Apple, let alone a senior executive at Apple, you know, nowadays, Apple is one of the economies leading firms. So there's different, you know, just, you know, take and both firms are like, somewhat are considered somewhat technologically innovative in their time. So like, think of these, you know, kind of economy leading like blue chip companies that are that like defined the apex of the American economy in two different eras. One of them is constructed such that it's possible for a janitor to eventually become a senior executive, the other is constructed so as to make that impossible at all costs. And and and, you know, I think Irwin's piece gets exactly at this question of employment classification as being a crucial constituent of that changing reality. I would say that the ability to contract everything out and yet control everything so minutely use a, you know, arms legally at arm's length, but like economically, you know, at a very close distance and with total control to the boss, you know, that is we have to understand the erosion of antitrust is being just as much a part of that as the non enforcement of labor laws, the erosion of of enforcement of those and so on. Ryan Cooper 39:59 Yeah, Yeah, that's that's a great dichotomy. I wanted to also, I wanted to bring up the the welfare state. I n, in, in a couple of these articles, you've mentioned how, you know, the gig economy and various sort of like, anti trust, you know, trying to escape any kind of liability for, for being responsible for one's, you know, employees has materially harmed workers by sort of excluding them from, you know, like traditional welfare state stuff, which is often administered through, you know, through the employment relation. But you've you've also written about how, like the cares act, part, partly helped with that, and then partly maybe, sort of entrenched the bad relationship. But, you know, in general, the cares act was like a pretty astounding piece. I mean, it's seems mostly expired now. But, like, it was a really interesting piece of legislative legislation that, that helped people out a lot and kind of revealed a lot of underlying, you know, deficiencies in the way that people in DC have done policy for the last like, 40 years. So can you can you kind of go through, like, the how the welfare state interacts with, you know, anti trust, and and, you know, kind of kind of how the two can can complement each other? And how they that might be fixed? Marshall Steinbaum 41:41 Yeah, absolutely. So,we've been talking a lot about this question of the legal employment relationship, and why that matters so much for workers. And a big reason why it matters so much is exactly as you said, that so much of our welfare state is conditioned on employment. And so that's what you know. So in some sense, this like category, that's kind of, you know, not the main focus of attention at the time of the New Deal. You're that this distinction, the question of like employment independent contractor, and that is an important distinction, as I was referring to in the antitrust cases that we talked about earlier. But like, this idea that, you know, a lot matters for you economically, on the question of whether you are legally an employee or not, that's not true to the New Deal era, per se, it's that's what's been layered on since and especially since we kind of adopted the backlash to the Great Society view that the problem with the welfare state is that it causes people not to work and inculcates a culture of poverty. You know, all of that is basically racist drivel. But it's had an enormous impact on the kind of Orthodoxy around welfare policy, especially in DC. So as I've talked about, either of I've talked about in this podcast, certainly a couple of times on podcasts with bruenig. And in some other writings, you know, there's this sort of mania for the Earned Income Tax Credit among DC policy wonk types, which is this, basically wage subsidy for people who were employed in market labor, and it doesn't help you if you're not employed in market labor, and arguably, it hurts you, even if you are employed to market labor, and you don't receive it, because it by causing people to, you know, as sort of have to be employed to market labor in order to gain the benefit and arguably depresses wages for people who aren't beneficiaries, so reduces the market wage, basically. You know, that cares act is kind of by chance, the opposite of that. So first of all, you said that the cares act was like this revolutionary thing. It was that with respect to that unemployment insurance position, provision, so called pandemic unemployment compensation, and then pandemic unemployment assistance, we'll get to what those two things are in a second, the rest of the cares act for you know, it also included a, you know, sort of like one off $1200 check from the IRS, you know, for people earning about, I guess, it was like below 100,000 a year. And then there was like, a ton of stuff that was basically an indefinite extension of a whole, like firehose of money to, you know, the economy's leading corporations via the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. But I think, especially the Federal Reserve, so you're saying it's, like, mostly expired now? Well, not the part that gave capital, everything they want it that part's not expired, and that's exactly why the other part hasn't been renewed. So there was a sense, you know, the kind of political calculus that gave rise to the cares act is like, you know, we have like, suddenly a pandemic has hit the economy, it's going to be temporary, you know, so we need to, like, we need something to tie people over, let's juice up the unemployment insurance system, give people $1200 checks. And make sure all these businesses are able to borrow, you know, that are facing, you know, huge sudden shortfalls. It's like, oh, but you know, by the way, the last of those things that will be permanent, the first of those things will be temporary, because the pandemic is assumed to be temporary, and oh, wait, the pandemic is not temporary, or at least it's less temporary than we thought it was gonna be. You know, those people are suddenly high and dry because capitalists already got everything they wanted. So it's like we're in a pretty shitty situation, frankly, visa for pretty much all working people, but the stock market's doing great. Okay, so what did the cares act have for unemployment insurance? And why is that such a challenge to kind of policy received wisdom, it basically added this lump. So the PUC part, pandemic unemployment compensation added a lump sum $600 per week, on to traditionally eligible workers for unemployment. So that's PUC so if you're eligible for unemployment, there's some state formula that says that's a function of what your wages were pre layoff. You know, generally as as the lingo and unemployment insurance is replacement rates, so it's how much of your loss of your lost wages are, quote, replaced by unemployment insurance, you know, the average in the United States for people who are eligible is something like 50%. And like 50% of unemployed people aren't eligible or was not able to collect it, you know, very, like leaky sieve type system, that P You see, element of the cares act up to that number by whatever the replacement rate was under state law plus $600, which for a lot of workers is basically, you know, a gigantic windfall relative to the shittiness of the jobs that they actually have to do. So many workers, especially in low wage occupations experienced, you know, better pay when they were receiving the PVC than they did in their jobs and that they're ever likely to get in their jobs. PUA was the version of that for the gig economy. Basically, it was for workers who were not eligible for traditional unemployment insurance. And many gig economy workers were dis employed by the pandemic, this was a fully federal system that essentially gave them access to a temporary pool of unemployment insurance. And the key thing there is at the time, I wrote a letter with Sen. jepto, whom I mentioned earlier, I wrote a letter to Congress about that they have basically done a kind of ex post bailout of the of all of the misclassification that gig economy firms have been doing for a decade now. Because they're saying, Oh, you know, Uber has never paid a dime in unemployment insurance premiums for its workers, and they become unemployed all the time. Suddenly, in this pandemic, many of those workers are eligible for unemployment insurance, thanks to PUA. So that's great that they're, you know, able to subsist, but instead of paying into it, you know, Uber gets to skate for 10 years on its premiums, and then the federal government pays for that. So that was, you know, kind of, you know, a, under the radar screen bailout of the gig economy, employers. Anyway, now, you know, we're in this position where these things have been taken away, and what that has meant, you know, so the interesting thing that's come out in the economics research about the effect of the cares act, and specifically these UI provisions, is that, you know, that pandemic is and has been devastating to the low wage workforce, huge, extreme spike in unemployment, it's still very high, you know, a lot of service workers have been disappointed. But actually poverty rates went down, and earnings went up, or income went up, because their income was more than replaced by these temporary, generous provisions that were not conditional on showing up for work, because they couldn't be conditional on showing up for work, the whole point of the pandemic is that people can do their work, you know, now, you know, and, you know, given that like that, like, in the midst of an economic catastrophe, we reduce the poverty rate, you know, that like flies in the face of everything that we know about how the poverty, you know, the poverty rate usually goes up when there's an economic recession. And what we just found out is like, if you don't want that to happen, if you do want to reduce poverty, you have to enact these policies that aren't conditional on work. That's how you reduce policy, you give people money, basically, and in this case, unemployed people are the people who are likely to be dev low income to be in poverty. So that's how you get money to. So now, you know, we're kind of I mean, because of this political misjudgment that had, you know, given capital, everything and wanted while workers bailouts was temporary, you know, now it's like, Okay, well, like, please give us something for workers. You know, I think the the view had been that, like the election would be the leverage that, you know, pro worker interests would have over the federal political system, but that's not the case, actually, because the outcomes of elections aren't terribly responsive to the the well being of the population, which is a big problem that we should probably do something about at some point. But But, you know, so now it's like, Okay, well, we're sort of like pleading for scraps the way that we have been for the last decades, and everyone's reverted to, you know, basically versions of the EITC expansions that have been on their, you know, to do list for for a long time. So it's like, okay, you know, the wanks have guy kind of gotten back control in control of the message and the asks and whatever. And, you know, consequently, the agenda has gotten shittier. Alexi 49:39 never a good idea to give the Wong's power. But now, like so far, I just want to recap for the audience. We have number one left anchor Steinbaum, synthesis of anti trust and democratic socialism, to new idea breaking news, let's make government responsive to the needs of the people. That's that's that's what we've so these two important things that we're offering now. But But no, I think first of all the point point very well taken that, you know, our favorite game about the Democrats, is it malfeasance and or is it malice? You know, is it is it just, you know, bad politics or or is it just intentional, you know, slap in the face to the working people of this country into the poor. So, so yeah, yeah, point point well taken that the the corporations were given a, you know, indefinite Lifeline, and then I think they accidentally helped the poor and helped the working class, probably because they didn't realize how low pain, you know, jobs were out there. Yeah. Marshall Steinbaum 50:39 Yeah. I mean, that's exactly right. It was pretty clear at the time that like, there was just sort of No, I mean, I think the rhetoric in Washington is like, somewhat responsive to, you know, insofar as there's any responsiveness to workers, it's like, you know, people who are not precariously employed. So, you know, that I, you know, so it's like they don't it's like any job is a good job, or they are not, that's a little bit of an overstatement. But it's like, you know, what we want to prevent as people losing their jobs, as long as they have their a job, there'll be fine. And, you know, there's just a very, very little apprehension on the part of like, the policy elite of like, just how bad most jobs Alexi 51:18 but look, Marshall, we all know, worst case scenario, as Mitt Romney said back in the day, if you're really in a tough situation, just sell your stocks if you have to just Marshall Steinbaum 51:28 Yes, yeah, yeah, right. Right. Just that Yeah, Dad stock at American Motors or whatever, you know, what you can afford? Right? I Ryan Cooper 51:33 mean, it was a tough thing to have to do. But sometimes you got to just bootstrap it. Marshall Steinbaum 51:40 Yeah, so well, you know, now now, Romney is a resistance hero. He's doing everything he can to bring our Trump Reign of Terror to an end Ryan Cooper 51:47 he is, thank thank God for him, honestly. Yeah, so so to, I guess, to kind of like, like, tie a tie that together a little bit. You know, like, the welfare state is, you know, just like a critical lifeline. You know, like the cares act shows, you know, that, that, that four decades of neoliberalism was all bullshit, actually, we could solve poverty quickly and easily, just by, you know, dumping money on people who don't have money. That's literally It's that easy. But I think, you know, the interesting thing to me about, like, this whole discussion about, like market regulation, and so on and so forth, is that, like, I'm pretty convinced that the, you know, in so far as your, the economy is based to some degree around, you know, private businesses, you know, doing their thing, competition is a is a fairly useful tool, if it's done, right. And that means competition, that's that that happens, you know, through a sort of regulated process, because you can have competition that just means trying to cheat, and like drive the other guy out of business, so you can seize more market share, you know, try and try to force companies to compete on price and quality. And that means big government, basically. You know, an example I've seen recently, you know, the computer chip market for for like desktop PCs. That's like a pretty concentrated market. But there is competition there between AMD and Intel. And Intel's had like a big chunk of you know, the marketplace for for many years, AMD has been sort of a laggard for the last couple years AMD like they basically just beat Intel, it's better, better chips for cheaper. And suddenly Intel's on the backfoot. And they're doing all this stuff, they're retooling their, their machine to try to sort of, like, exceed, and like, that, I think is a reasonable process, so long as it's not, you know, like, you don't you don't end up with competition that takes place like, okay, we're shipping all of our, you know, all of our factories to Tanzania, and we're just gonna pay everyone $1 you know, make them buy all their stuff in company script, that kind of competition. But, you know, and then also, you could, you could say, like, oh, we're going to set up something like the post office as explicitly a monopoly, but it's going to be a monopoly with a sort of government policy purpose, like everybody has to get the same service for the same price even if it's like ridiculously uneconomical to provide it in a certain location. And that's like a kind of different that's like about quality government and how do you set up a agency with some sort of a spirit a core that like, does a good job. But like, I think the, you know, my sort of like fundamental takeaway, and maybe you can sort of quibble with this or qualify, Marshall is that like, like, the anti trust, and, you know, breaking up, like, like full on monopolies and like forcing the businesses to compete decently and, you know, the sort of like welfare state, you know, social democratic vision, these things like there are two, they can be two great tastes that taste great together. And, you know, like, there's not necessarily a trade off. And then like, one could sort of enable the other. What do you think? Marshall Steinbaum 55:40 Yeah, I mean, I think that you can have a, you know, what might be called Race to the Top type of competition, I'm not exactly sure what's going on in the, you know, desktop computer chip market, but like, branding, what you the way you characterized it, or you can have race to the bottom competition, which is basically about sort of chiseling out your company's own regulatory arbitrage, or like, You're the one who gets to run the taxi company, but not actually charge the regulated rate, or you're the one who locates the factory in Tanzania so that you can pollute all you want and pay your workers like crap. And then you know, then you're in, you know, quote, unquote, competition with domestic producers, you know, who are then obviously incentivized to do the same themselves, I have tended to move away from the concept of competition, exactly, in some ways, exactly. For the reason that you're saying it. And for the reasons I just said, which is that it is not, it doesn't really work as like, we want more of it, or we want less of it, because there's different forms of it, as we were just saying, Yeah, and, you know, in particular, I have moved away from that concept of competition vis a vis antitrust law, like I just don't agree, now, now I have come to the view that I don't agree that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition. I think it is because, you know, for the reasons like that the world in which, you know, a US domestic manufacturer relocates overseas to take advantage of poor environmental and labor standards, you know, that's like, an act, you know, that could be understood as an anti competitive act vis a vis the workers, but like a pro competitive act vis a vis competitors, potentially. And so I don't think like it's, you know, a policy regime that gives workers that gives companies the ability to undercut their own workers through the threat of outsourcing isn't about promoting competition or repeating competition, it's about, you know, who gets to decide and the economy who has power, as Sanjukta said, who, to whom are coordination rights granted. And so my view is like, antitrust has one disposition of the allocation of coordination rights or, you know, who gets to operate as a monopoly or as a dominant firm versus who is subjected to their domination, which is designed subjected to competition under the current way of doing things that would be workers, so like, a dominant employer, you know, subjects workers to competition, so the workers have plenty of competition, and that's what reduces their labor standards. And I think that is exactly what is kind of tripped up or created this false dichotomy between like, anti monopoly ism versus socialism, because from a workers perspective, more competition is bad. Because they, you know, that's exactly what the economy already consists of, whereas from a, you know, sort of corporate perspective, you know, exactly what characterizes the economy is a lack of competition, that is to say, you know, dominance, not just in any one market, you know, where, you know, many major industries are basically, you know, an oligopoly if not a monopoly, and then, you know, vertical integration and vertical control, you know, that subjects, disadvantage actors to competitive forces and insulates powerful actors from those competitive forces. And what we want is the erosion of the concentration of power, which is to say, to, at least, you know, through the mechanism of competition that would be to subject powerful actors to competitive forces and protect unpowerful actors from them. Ryan Cooper 59:00 Well, well said. Go ahead. I was gonna just do a just out of left field kind of question about, because it seems like non domination seems to be the maybe the principle that would kind of work through the synthesis of democratic socialism and the antitrust, kind of coalitional movement. And what do you think? How would you understand that principle, working with other ideas that the left is is kind of fighting over whether it's job guarantee or UBI? You know, how do you think this overall leftist synthesis should think through what principles can help us kind of navigate these contests or which policies to to kind of fight over and propose as the most important to push for? Marshall Steinbaum 59:48 Yeah, well, I absolutely do think that non domination is the principle that's at play here. And that's why I support both UBI a job guarantee and I don't believe that there needs to be a clash between those two things. I mean, I have often thought and if I, you know, had a vast research budget of my command, I would indeed, commission this, you know that there should be a sort of left pro labor like pro low wage labor agenda that consists of a UBI, like the cares act, except not just for unemployed people, but including them, a job guarantee, which is to save full employment, you know, macroeconomic commitment to full employment, and a $15, minimum wage, as well as the enforcement of other labor standards, like maximum hours, and, you know, safe workplaces and that sort of thing. All of those things together to me form like the tripartite are the three legs of the stool of like a, you know, pro labor left agenda as against the EITC. And basically anything that's conditional on supply, market labor for in order to receive benefits. So like all three of the things I mentioned, what characterizes them is rights, and entitlements accruing to the worker that's independent of any one employer. And that's all of that is at odds with existing policy orthodoxy, for example, the EITC, the other thing that I have written about a great deal is a student debt and labor market credential is Asian. So I interpret the rise of student debt as being basically the federal government's most ambitious labor market policy of the last few decades, which is the idea that like, oh, if people are earning enough in the labor market, they need more human capital, so they need more higher education, and we'll lend them the money to get that higher education, and then their earnings will go up, like that has, you know, kind of spiraled out of control, because people's earnings haven't gone up. So they're left with a bigger pile of debt than they would have had otherwise, and consequently, aren't paying it off. But like, all the real big reason why the whole, like student debt and Higher Education and Human Capital approach to labor market policy hasn't worked, it's because it also doesn't take into account employer power and the domination, that bosses are able to exercise over workers in a capitalist economy. So what the effect of that, you know, student debt thing in the labor market has been to basically shift the cost of training or being trained for your job or qualified for your job to individuals from employers or from, you know, the public higher education system, you know, these, this is just the transfer of those costs to the shoulders of the agent that's like least able to shoulder them.

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NR---Extinction

#### Human existence is desirable---life is a prerequisite to generate value and ponder secondary questions of ethics

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Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### This framing of the human subject is not exclusive of the Other---antiracist environmental action demands humanistic engagement.

Zeiderman 19 (Austin, anthropologist and associate professor in the Department of Geography and Environment at the London School of Economics, “Infrastructure, Environment, and Life in the Anthropocene,” Chapter 7: Low Tide, DOA: 6-27-2020) //Snowball

The radical instability of the categories of “life” and the “human” in the Anthropocene presents both dangers and opportunities for antiracist thought and practice, which matters greatly to those who have never enjoyed full inclusion within these categories. In a recent lecture to the Royal Geographical Society, Paul Gilroy interrogates the current attractions of posthumanism and asks what a “reparative humanism” might alternatively entail.11 If the idea of the Anthropocene forces us to rethink history beyond the human/ natural divide and to embrace posthumanism, he argues, then **a commitment to antiracist politics and ethics demands a continued engagement with humanism**. Inspired by Frantz Fanon, C. L. R. James, and Sylvia Wynter, Gilroy sees “reparative humanism” as a helpful, indeed necessary, response to the ethical and political challenges of the Anthropocene.

For Gilroy, “reparative humanism” directly links debates over the human and its limits to struggles against racial hierarchy and to what he calls the political ontology of race. After all, for much of history, a large swath of humanity has been downgraded to the status of “sub-humans,” “infra-humans,” “human-animals,” or “quasi-objects” and thereby relegated from the realms of full political, social, or economic personhood. The enforcement of the boundary around the human was most fully accomplished in and through the violence of racial slavery. Hence the line of thinking from classic works such as that of Sidney Mintz (1986) to more recent interventions by Katherine McKittrick (2013) that sees **the plantation with slave labor as its core standing at the center of capitalist modernity**. Such a recognition has been brought to discussions of **climate change** by Donna Haraway, Anna Tsing, and others who have endorsed the Plantationocene as an alternative name for the Anthropocene (Haraway et al. 2016; Haraway 2015).

In the journal Nature, Simon Lewis and Mark Maslin argue that the Anthropocene began around 1610, as the New World conquest “led to the largest population replacement in the past 13,000 years, the first global trade networks linking Europe, China, Africa, and the Americas, and the resultant mixing of previously separate biotas” (Lewis and Maslin 2015: 174). The Anthropocene, by this dating, is not only the era of global trade and biological mixing but also the era of colonial genocide and racial slavery (Davis and Turpin 2015: 8). In recognizing this, the concept of the Plantationocene responds to Gilroy’s long-standing concern about the rise in popularity of antihumanism, now extended to the strains of posthumanism enabled and endorsed by the idea of the Anthropocene. Both, he implies, potentially **weaken our ability to confront racial hierarchy, colonial conquest, and imperial power, past and present**. A world historical moment that forces us more than ever to think about and with the nonhuman may require all the more vigilant attention to the boundaries and limits of the human.

### 1NR---Growth Good

#### Warming magnifies settler impositions

Whyte 16. Kyle Powys Whyte, Michigan State University Timnick Chair in the Humanities, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Community Sustainability In Press. “Is it Colonial Déjà Vu? Indigenous Peoples and Climate Injustice” November 2016. . Humanities for the Environment: Integrating Knowledges, Forging New Constellations of Practice. Edited by Joni Adamson, Michael Davis, and Hsinya Huang. Earthscan Publications. Pages 88-104. ckm-eg.

Climate change fits succinctly within this pattern. For this reason, many contemporary Indigenous peoples are concerned about their vulnerability, or susceptibility to be harmed, by impacts associated with the observed rise of global average temperature, or climate change. That is, they are concerned about climate risks as they are increasingly confronted by change stemming from the carbon intensive economic activities of settler and other colonial societies. Climate change impacts can be seen through the lens of forms of containment (among other forms of domination), this time arising from settler contributions to increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Warming waters and receding glaciers affect the fish habitats in Indigenous territories all over the world, such as on the Pacific coast of North America where many Tribal nations harvest salmon for economic and cultural purposes (Bennett et al.). Sea level rise is pushing people living in the Village of Kivalina in Alaska, the Isle de St. Charles in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Carteret Atoll in Papua New Guinea to relocate (Maldonado et al.). In these cases we see 8 both shrinking habitats and relocation occurring again. The Loita Maasai peoples in Africa face droughts that affect the rain conditions required for performing many of their ceremonies (Saitabu). Indigenous women, girls and two spirit persons in the Arctic and Great Plains regions are subject to greater sexual violence, abuse and trafficking as work camps for oil and gas extraction, such as ‘fracking,’ bring in male contractors to profit from the resources found within Indigenous territories (Sweet). Climate change impacts and drivers represent another form of inflicted anthropogenic environmental change. Scientific reports confirm many of the threats just described. In 2014, the U.S. National Climate Assessment states that Indigenous peoples face the ‘loss of traditional knowledge in the face of rapidly changing ecological conditions, increased food insecurity… changing water availability, Arctic sea ice loss, permafrost thaw, and relocation from historic homeland’ (Bennett et al. 2). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report claims Indigenous peoples face ‘challenges to post-colonial power relations, cultural practices, their knowledge systems, and adaptive strategies’ (Adger et al.). Indigenous peoples’ own descriptions of climate risk indicate that settler and other colonial societies are imposing rapid environmental change that generates otherwise preventable harms. The Mandaluyong Declaration quotes Miskito women in the Americas who say, in response to changing environmental conditions, that “We now live in a hurry and daughters do not cook as grandmothers… We do not catch fish as before, do not cook as before; we cannot store food and seeds as before; the land no longer produces the same; small rivers are drying up… I think that along with the death of our rivers, our culture dies also.” (300-01). For many Indigenous peoples, these rapid changes are experienced as a continuation of settler colonialism and other forms of colonialism that they have endured for many years. For we have experienced these types of environmentally-related impacts before— from dietary change to relocation to sexual violence—though caused by different factors, such as multiple settler institutions of containment. Though institutions of containment represent just one limited example of a much more complex history with settler colonialism. Anthropogenic climate change is of a piece with forms of nonconsensual and harmful environmental change inflicted on our societies in the past. Some Indigenous peoples look at futures of 9 rampant climate injustice as looking to the cyclical history of settler and other colonial inflictions of anthropogenic environmental change on Indigenous peoples in order to instantiate erasure. Yet what is more insidious about climate injustice against Indigenous peoples is that the settler institutions such as those of containment, that inflicted environmental change in the past, are the same institutions that fostered carbon-intensive economic activities on Indigenous territories. That is, containment strategies, such as removal of Indigenous peoples to reservations or the forced adoption of corporate government structures, all facilitated extractive industries, deforestation and large-scale agriculture. What is more, and as I will discuss in more detail in later sections, these are the same institutions that today make it hard for many Indigenous peoples to effectively cope with climate change impacts. In this way, climate injustice against Indigenous peoples refers to the vulnerability caused by ongoing, cyclical colonialism both because institutions facilitate carbon-intensive economic activities that produce adverse impacts while at the same time interfering with Indigenous people’s capacity to adapt to the adverse impacts

#### Fossil fuel emissions disproportionately affect Black communities.

Johnson and Stokes 7/13/2020 – “Our racist fossil fuel energy system. The fossil fuel economy is killing Black Americans.” – Nikayla Jefferson is a member of the Sunrise Movement in San Diego. Leah C. Stokes is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. – https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/07/13/opinion/our-racist-fossil-fuel-energy-system/ – Spavs

American society is rife with racial inequities. Black people are 2.5 times more likely to be killed by police and five times more likely to be incarcerated than whites. But it’s not just the US criminal justice system that’s a problem: Our fossil fuel energy system is fundamentally racist. If you want to run a society on fossil fuels, you’re going to need sacrifice zones — places where the air is thick with pollution and where climate impacts can be ignored. The last time someone counted, 68 percent of Black Americans lived within 30 miles of a coal-fired plant. Many of these facilities, particularly across the South, are more expensive to run than is clean energy. Yet utilities like Southern Company keep their super polluting, uneconomic coal-fired plants open, no matter the costs for Black communities, simply because it’s in their financial interest. These decisions shorten Black lives. Research shows that white communities are exporting their pollution into Black backyards. As a result, Black children have asthma rates that are twice as high as white children. We’ve seen the consequences of this pollution burden in stark terms during the COVID-19 pandemic — it’s a key contributor to Black Americans’ higher death rate. The more scientists look, the more evidence they find: Our fossil fuel economy is killing Black Americans every day. New research shows that pregnant Black women are twice as likely to have stillborn babies than white mothers because of their unequal exposure to air pollution and heat waves. Climate change is already hitting Black communities the hardest. As we recently wrote in a report for Stacey Abrams’s think tank, Southern Economic Advancement Project, communities across the Southeast are on the front lines of flooding, sea-level rise, hurricanes, and heat waves. The scientific evidence is overwhelming: Pollution, climate impacts, and police violence all fall hardest on Black communities. But scientific facts have never stopped fossil fuel companies from denying the truth. Faced with increasing attention on racial justice, one fossil fuel company decided once again to lie to the public. As one report revealed, Chevron responded to the growing movement for racial justice by funding a PR campaign that claimed, “White environmentalists are hurting black communities by pushing radical climate policies that would strip them of fossil fuel jobs.” They advanced a false argument that addressing our fossil fuel pollution would “bring particular harm to minority communities.” As Harvard professor Naomi Oreskes responded: “There’s no socially acceptable language to describe how despicable this is.” In California, another fossil fuel company tried to take advantage of the fight for racial injustice to protect dirty energy. As Emily Aitken reported, a marketing firm linked to SoCalGas circulated fake reports that the NAACP opposed a plan for clean energy. This is the exact same tactic that fossil fuel companies used to try to block federal climate policy back in 2009. Make no mistake: Fossil fuel companies need to tell lies about the costs that their dirty infrastructure imposes on Black communities. Because if we understood the truth, and if we valued Black lives, there will be nowhere for the fossil fuel plants to go. And that wouldn’t just be a good thing for Black communities. It would also help Indigenous peoples, Latinx communities, and white Americans too. This is because the Movement for Black Lives is part of a long tradition of protecting all lives on this planet. At the first Earth Day in 1970, Wilbur Thomas, a Black environmental justice leader, spoke out about the racist policies driving pollution into Black communities. Today, support for climate action is higher among Black Americans, who are also more supportive of a Green New Deal. Ending the fossil fuel era would save Black lives. And it would also save Americans from all walks of life who are sick of breathing dirty air, fleeing wildfires, and hunkering down for the latest hurricane. It’s time to face facts. If Americans are sincere that Black lives matter, the fossil fuel era must end. Just as we cannot accept a world where Black Americans’ final words at the hands of the police are “I can’t breathe,” we cannot accept a world where our fossil fuel dependence poisons Black communities, so that every day across our country, Black Americans can’t breathe.

### 1NR---Health

#### Political optimism is good for black health — progress is verified by data and believing in a better future improves quality of life.

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Is Pessimism the Only Sensible or Empirically Warranted Response in these Two Arenas?

It is easy to find evidence to support pessimism about American racial dynamics or the societal deployment of genomic science. The United States is notorious for its racially- and ethnically-inflected poverty and excessive levels of incarceration; undocumented migrants live in legal limbo; new genomics techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 tempt humankind into hubristic manipulation of nature, and scientists’ promises to cure cancer through genetics knowledge ring hollow to many. The question for this article is whether there are also strong grounds for optimism in my two illustrative realms, such that one could plausibly and persuasively choose to be “centered on advancement concerns” rather than “centered on security concerns.”

The answer is yes. Again I can point only to illustrative, suggestive evidence. First, the gap between blacks’ and whites’ life expectancy declined from seven years in 1990 to 3.4 years in 2014. That is an astonishing, perhaps unprecedented, rate of change given the usual slow pace of demographic transformation. It is important in itself, of course, and also as a summary statement about an array of other social phenomena in which racial disparities are declining. Blacks are living longer mainly because of declining rates of homicides, HIV mortality, infant mortality, cancer and heart disease, and suicide among black men.19 A lot of things have to go right for a group’s life expectancy to rise rapidly.

Second, applications for U.S. citizenship rose from the previous year in ten of the fifteen years from 2000 to 2015, while declining in four (and remaining stable in one). That is an important indicator of immigrant incorporation, and especially relevant to politica scientists because “Hispanics and Asians who are naturalized citizens tend to have higher voter turnout rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.” 20

Third, non-white Americans themselves tend to feel pretty good about their lives. Gallup Poll asked in 2016, “Where do you expect your life satisfaction to be in five years?” If whites’ response is standardized at 1, then blacks are at 2.97, and Hispanics at 1.29. Only Asian Americans, at 0.97, were less optimistic than whites. Gallup also asked about one’s level of stress in the previous day. If whites are again standardized at 1, then blacks are at 0.48; Hispanics at 0.53; and Asian Americans at 0.75. Middle-class blacks were half as likely as middle class whites to report stress during the previous day.21

In the arena of genomics also, one can point to grounds for optimism rather than pessimism. The Innocence Project, “dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice,” has enabled about 350 people to be released from prison. (Not so parenthetically, seven out of ten are African American or Latino, mostly poor men.) More extensive DNA testing might lead to many more exonerations; one careful analysis of serious crime convictions found that “in five percent of homicide and sexual assault cases DNA testing eliminated the convicted offender as the source of incriminating physical evidence.” Previous estimates had pegged the share of wrongful convictions at no more than one to two percent.22 More generally, “DNA profiling [of convicted felons] reduces the probability of future convictions by 17% for serious violent offenders and by 6% for serious property offenders .... These are likely underestimates of the true deterrent effect of DNA profiling.” 23

Genomic scientists can point to impressive successes with regard to Mendelian (single-gene) diseases, and they focus even more on diagnoses and cures yet to come. Eric Lander, director of the Broad Institute, likens the trajectory of genomic medicine to the development of medicine based on the germ theory of disease, which “took about 75 years. With genomics, we’re maybe halfway through that cycle.” In his view, “the rate of progress is just stunning. As costs continue to come down, we are entering a period where we are going to be able to get the complete catalogue of disease genes.” Cancer is a prime target, almost in sight:“If you understand that this is a game of probability, and there is only a finite number of cancer cells and each has only a certain chance of mutating, and if we can put together two or three independent attacks on the cancer cell, we win. If we invest vigorously in this and we attract the best young people into this field, we get it done in a generation. If we don’t, it takes two generations.” Lander is “not Pollyanna .... [I]t’s not for next year. We play for the long game. I don’t want to overpromise in the short term, but it is incredibly exciting if you take the 25-year view.” 24

This is a classic statement of optimism, or being centered on advancement concerns. It begins with expertise and perspective, sees dangers and weaknesses, and nonetheless asserts empirical grounds for faith. President Obama’s insistence that “if you had to choose a moment in human history to live ... you’d choose now” has the same quality. My point is not that left pessimism is wrong—only that there are grounds, perhaps equally strong, for left optimism. One can choose either, and then find good evidence for that choice.

Why Is Left Pessimism Problematic?

That wily politician, Barney Frank, offers the best answer from the vantage point of the public arena: “When you tell your supporters that nothing has gotten better, and that any concessions you’ve received are mere tokenism, you take away their incentive to stay mobilized. As for those you’re negotiating with, if you denigrate anything they concede as worthless, they will soon realize they can obtain the same response by giving nothing at all.” 25

One can offer the same type of answer from the vantage point of a teacher. Many of us have had the experience of teaching a course—about civil war, inequality and politics, environmental policy, or the meaning of liberty—only to have our students politely request on the last day of class some idea or piece of information about which they can feel good or which they can use in their public engagement. We need to offer answers. Optimism may also be associated with academic success; one careful study found that “although achievement in mathematics was most strongly related to prior achievement and grade level, optimism and pessimism were significant factors. In particular, students with a more generally pessimistic outlook on life had a lower level of achievement in mathematics over time.” 26A study of college students similarly found that “dispositional and academic optimism were associated with less chance of dropping out of college, as well as better motivation and adjustment. Academic optimism was also associated with higher grade point average.” 27

And for those of us of a certain age, it is heartening to discover that “after adjusting for covariates, the results suggested that greater optimism [among middle-aged, predominantly white Americans] was associated with greater high-density lipoprotein cholesterol and lower triglycerides .... In conclusion, ... optimism is associated with a healthy lipid profile; moreover, these associations can be explained, in part, by the presence of healthier behaviors and a lower body mass index.” 28

# 2NR

### 2NR- AT: Sullivan – It Flows Neg

#### Third, our framework solves – it allows for cultivation of strategies for black folk to respond to racism by enabling them to exploit the predictable self-interest of whites, which is explicitly not the politics of hope because these strategies act as coping mechanisms and generates value despite the permanence of racism.

Note: Highlighting is color coordinated to match the specific warrants for each argument. A version of Coppell’s highlighting (from Smarx round 4) is purple.

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IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, significant racial inequalities and anti-black violence continue to be rampant in the United States. Decades, even centuries, of political and legal struggle have deco lisle to change that fact. This chapter will argue that black Americans need new tactics and strategies for responding to the white class privilege and white supremacy that fundamentally structure the country.' They need to increase the number and type of tools in their racial justice toolkit, expanding beyond liberal faith in civil rights and white people's good intentions to cooperate with racial change. The political and legal work that black and other people of color (along with some white people) have done to eliminate antiblack racism isn't working. Pragmatists in particular need to be able to face up to that fact given that we value the practical work that ideas, concepts, and truths can do. Why then, as Calvin Warren pragmatically asks in the epigraph above, would we expect people fighting racism to keep doing the same thing? Why would anyone hope that the same failed actions and strategies would mm out any differentia the future? This kind of hope can function as a cruel optimism that "works" by keeping black people focused on the very thing that undercuts their flourishing (Warren 2015, 221). In line with Warren's concerns, I argue that black America' hope that political struggle can achieve racial justice tends to be a harmed emotion they should avoid. I maim my case in a pragmatist spirit that opposes Comet West's influential argument for black hope In contrast to West, I contend that pragmatists and others concerned about racial injustice would do better to draw on Derrick Bell's racial realism and Warren's blank nihilism to develop alternative strategies for addressing antiblack racism In related ways, Bell and Warren urge their readers to reckon with the permanence of racism and to give op hope that additional political struggle will eliminate it. After exploring their complementary accounts, I augment them with concrete evidence from the health sciences that black hope can be physically harmful to black people, weathering their bodies nod damaging their psychosomatic health such that they are less able to withstand the inequities of anti-black racism. I conclude by arguing for the advantages of reading Bell's and Warren's claims about the permanence of racism pragmatically, that is, by assessing the truth of their claims via their effects. The result m the working hypothesis that black people will have a much greater chance of developing new practices, habits, and strategies of flourishing in an anti-black world if they no longer hope that political struggle will eliminate racism.

[Coppell’s card ends]

The United States continues to struggle with deeply ingrained racial inequalities and wildly flagrant acts of racialized injustice even after abolishing its Jim Crow laws in the 1960s. From 2014 to 2016, for example, the United States was rocked by news of the violent deaths of unarmed black people at the hands of white police officers: Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; Eric Garner in New York; Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio; Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina; and the list could go on. (For analysis, see Zack 2015.) Their deaths were soon followed by the fatal shooting of nine black people in a church in Charleston, South Carolina, by the alleged white supremacist Dylan Roof; the burning of several prominent black churches in the South as a possible backlash to calls for South Carolina to stop flying the Confederate flag; and the police shooting of Keith Scott in Charlotte, North Carolina, and Terence Crutcher in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

The shocking violence against black Americans has occurred against a backdrop of chronic and growing racial inequality that the elimination of legal segregation has done little to address. Examples include the fact that in 2012, African American women made 64 cents for every dollar that a non-Hispanic white man made (Kerby 2013). Racial disparities in health also exist, for example in disproportionately higher rates of coronary artery disease, diabetes, stroke, HIV/AIDS, and infant mortality for African Americans (Smedley et al., no date). As of 2005, African Americans were incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of white people (Mauer and King 2007). Black families regularly are the targets of child welfare services that shift black children into foster homes, a process that fuels the schoolto-prison pipeline since children in foster homes are significantly more likely to go to prison than children who remain with their parents/families (Roberts 2002). A racialized aesthetics continues to benefit white people and penalize people of color: white beauty standards are normative, especially for women, positioning dark-skinned and black women as “the beauty don’ts” in contrast to white women as “the beauty dos” (Bossip 2015). This list could go on.

In the face of this discouraging present-day picture, hope for a better future would seem to be vital. Black hope in particular would appear crucial for enabling black people to carry on in the face of ongoing white domination and racial inequities. On this view, hope for a better world, a world that does not yet exist but that serves as a guiding ideal, is needed to provide the emotional fuel for the hard work that it will take to get closer to that world. To switch metaphors, black hope would seem to emotionally counterbalance the despair that white economic, social, geographical, and other forms of privilege will never end, both the despair of black people who suffer from white racism and that of white people who call for racism’s demise. As Patrick Shade has argued, “Hoping can be sustaining, nurturing—indeed, advantageous. … And so [in a cynical world] we should salvage the good name of hope and actively promote its life at every turn” (2001, 6, 202). While Shade’s pragmatist theory makes clear that hope must be grounded in present realities, it also depicts hope as tied inextricably to better possibilities in the future.

Shade’s positive view of hope complements that of Cornel West. Fighting what he calls “the specter of despair [that] haunts America,” West (2005) has made the most influential case for the importance of hope for African American people and communities. His criticism of black nihilism develops a conception of hope that is as deeply existentialist as it is pragmatist: it responds to the absurdity of a world that is built on the injustices and cruelties of white slavery, white segregation, white supremacy, and white class privilege. Even more important from West’s perspective, his conception of hope offers an alternative to the despair that he worries has pervaded African American lives. West appreciates that other emotions such as rage can serve as an antidote to despair, but he instead counsels hope. According to West (1993), the source of the “nihilistic threat” to and “major enemy of black survival in America is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the loss of hope.” For West, hope is the emotion that best describes black Americans’ history of struggle and that can keep black people sane in the ongoing struggles of the present. It is communal and inclusive, striving to make the world a more just place for everyone and particularly to “sustain black solidarity in the midst of a hostile society” (West 1999, 437). West’s hope is for the end of the “existential alienation, isolation and separation” that is entangled with racist discourses and that plagues many Western cultures (1999, 263).

To its credit, West’s particular account of hope is not Pollyannaish. For West, hope is not equivalent to optimism or to any other merely positive feeling. Optimism isn’t tough enough to do the job that black people need, as West (2005) charges: “Optimism adopts the role of the spectator who surveys the evidence in order to infer that things are going to get better. Yet we know that the evidence does not look good. The dominant tendencies of our day are unregulated global capitalism, racial balkanization, social breakdown, and individual depression.” In contrast, hope is actively participant and grounded, but also not bound by what the evidence tells us. Unlike optimism, West explains, “hope looks at the evidence and says, ‘It doesn’t look good at all. Doesn’t look good at all. Gonna go beyond the evidence to create new possibilities based on visions that become contagious to allow people to engage in heroic actions always against the odds, no guarantee whatsoever.’ That’s hope” (quoted in A. Smith 2006, 160). Optimism also tends to run out of energy when the going gets difficult. “When you talk about hope, you have to be a long distance runner,” West (2008, 209) insists, because it is going to take time and hard work to make racial progress in the United States.

On West’s view, however, significant progress has been made. He would sharply characterize as “narrow” the view that things are no better for black people today than they were in the days of slavery. He argues that “progressive formations have been the history of black folk” and that additional “progressive possibilities are reemerging” in the twenty-first century (2008, 214). For West, the road toward racial equality might be long, hard, and even difficult to discern, but it can and does lead to a genuinely democratic America that lives up to its constitutional promise of freedom and liberty for all. Black people are crucial to the realization of this possibility according to West, and thus they need to buoy themselves up with hope. In West’s opinion, Americans need to acknowledge “the degree to which black people in America provide one of the fundamental keys to the future, if the future is going to be about freedom and equality” (2008, 194). West’s ideal of deep democracy in America thus is fueled by black people’s “hope linked to combative spirituality,” which empowers black people to “go against the grain and muster the love and will to resist” (2008, 209).

For all the absurdity of white domination and West’s refusal to be optimistic about its defeat, West’s notion of communal hope—like that of most pragmatists, I would surmise—is deeply humanist. I use “humanism” here in the sense that Albert Camus (1991) characterizes it. As Camus would charge, West’s humanism refuses to believe in the permanence of white racism and/or that the evil of white racism cannot someday be overcome by human struggle. (I will return to Camus below in the context of Bell’s work.) Or perhaps it would be more accurate to call West’s progressivism as much religious as it is pragmatist because of the prophetic Christianity that informs it. Human beings alone might not be able to overcome racist evil; they might need religious help to do so. Either way, however, West’s existential progressivism/pragmatism is grounded in a conviction that the right thing will happen in the end. However bad things look now, however difficult it is to envision a happy ending, we can go beyond the evidence and engage in heroic actions to create a better future. Racial inequalities might still exist, so the progressive story continues, but think about how our ancestors went against the odds and overcame chattel slavery and Jim Crow. With ongoing political struggle, we also can do that—we can make the leap. We today can improve the world’s racial situation even further. Don’t give up hope: racial justice can and will be achieved someday.

But what if someday never comes? What if, as Bell has argued, the political, legal, and historical circumstances of the United States have made “racism … an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society” and thus “Black people will never gain full equality in this country” (1992a, ix, 12; see also Bell 1992b)? In that case, ongoing hope that political struggle will end racism is a farce: a joke that mocks black people without their realizing it, hoodwinking them into thinking that better times are on the horizon if they only will suffer and struggle more to reach them. According to Bell, that’s a fair assessment of where things stand in the United States at the end of the twentieth century, and by extension at the beginning of the twenty-first. Federal civil rights laws and policies, such as affirmative action, the desegregation of US schools, voting rights acts (which, notably, were eliminated by the US Supreme Court in October 2013), and fair housing acts, have failed to overcome the devastating legacy of chattel slavery in the United States. Bell writes in 1992 that the income gap between the rich and poor—a very racially colored gap—was nearing a crisis point, but the gap he was concerned about is a mere sliver compared to the chasm of racial disparities in wealth that exist today (Bell 1992a, 8–9). The economic recession of 2008 was particularly hard on black households in the United States; by 2010 the median net household worth of white American families was twenty-two times that of black American families (Luhby 2012).

The water fountain signs in the United States that say “colored” and “white” may have disappeared, but post-segregation changes such as these do not mean that racial discrimination has disappeared, or even necessarily been weakened. They might mean merely that the form of racial discrimination has changed and, moreover, changed into something largely unofficial and delivered via race-neutral policies and language that only makes white class privilege more difficult to identify and combat. In that case, as Bell predicts, “even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance” (1992b, 373). Black Americans need to accept that white racism is as virulent as ever and that they will always have a “permanent subordinate status” in their country (1992a, 12).

Bell realized very soon after the civil rights era that the idea that the United States is making progress against racism tends merely to inflate the egos and assuage the guilt of good white liberals. “The worship of equality rules benefits whites by preserving a benevolent but fictional selfimage, and such worship benefits blacks by preserving hope,” Bell observes and then adds, “but I think we’ve arrived at a place in history where the harms of such worship outweigh its benefits” (1992a, 101). Along with the belief that white people and institutions will ever regard or treat black people as equals, black people need to jettison the hopeful expectation that white racism will ever end. Acknowledging “the permanence of [black people’s] subordinate status” in the United States, Bell explains, “allows [black Americans] to avoid despair, and frees [them] to imagine and implement racial strategies that can bring fulfillment and even triumph” (1992b, 373–374).

Most people—especially, but not only white people—have yet to acknowledge how resilient white domination is in the United States. From chattel slavery to Jim Crow to “the new Jim Crow” (Alexander 2012), the more white domination changes, the more it stays the same. “Supposedly, the generation that murdered Trayvon Martin and Renisha McBride is much better than the generation that murdered Emmett Till,” Warren dryly remarks, and this so-called improvement is supposed to encourage black people that even more “progress” in black lives—and deaths—can be achieved (2015, 217). As Warren’s quip suggests, by participating in hopeful political struggle for a future filled with racial equality that likely never will be present, West’s existential pragmatism not only unintentionally benefits white people. It also harms black people by enacting what Warren calls “the politics of hope,” which establishes an insidiously false dichotomy between hope and nihilism. On the logic of political hope, if a person or group of people doesn’t have a hopeful relationship to the future, then they must be sunk in nihilistic despair. The politics of hope thus “terrifies with the dread of ‘no alternative,’ ” which operates not just via the binary of hope/despair but also by the complementary binaries of “problem/solution” and “action/inaction” (2015, 222). If one hopes and takes action, one can find a future solution to today’s problems. According to the politics of hope, hope is necessary for motivating political action to find answers to racial problems. Giving up hope thus raises the specter of inaction, of doing nothing and thus accepting the racist status quo. Hopelessness thus is the equivalent of a failed relationship to the future, which in turn is the equivalent of refusing to fight racial injustice.

The lure of the always-not-yet solution to present-day racial problems is symptomatic of the metaphysical nature of political hope, according to Warren. Political hope’s future object of racial justice is “not tethered to real history,” which makes it an “object of political fantasy” rather than an achievable goal (Warren 2015, 221). “The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in relation to this political object—in an unending pursuit of it,” Warren explains, and this pursuit “strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black being” (2015, 221). Black people’s political struggle for this fantastical freedom enables modern societies to pride themselves on their advanced civilization; in this way, black suffering is necessary for modernity’s promises of progress. Freedom as modernity knows it was created by means of chattel slavery, and thus “black emancipation is world destructive” for modernity and its ideals (Patterson 1982; see also Warren 2015, 239). Black suffering cannot be ended without the known world coming to an end, and so the world uses black hope to keep black suffering in place (Warren 2015, 242).

While Warren’s argument against the politics of hope primarily targets its metaphysical nature, the destruction of black bodies that he analyzes is no mere abstraction. Neither, of course, are the intractable racial inequalities described by Bell. In both cases, antiblackness involves “the literal destruction of black bodies that provide the psychic, economic, and philosophical resources for modernity to objectify, forget, and ultimately obliterate Being (nonmetaphysical Being)” (Warren 2015, 327). This occurred initially through the transatlantic transformation of human beings into things (slaves) and then subsequently through other social, legal, and extralegal ways of annihilating black people and communities, including political tactics such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and the convict leasing system (2015, 216).

Recent developments in the medical health sciences reveal another material way to see how the metaphysical, legal, and economic destruction of black people via hope is both literal and physical. A concrete connection between hope and poor health and death exists for black Americans, and I now turn to that connection to bodily situate Bell’s and Warren’s accounts. Psychologists and other social scientists in the United States recently have focused on how African Americans cope with so-called mundane racism: not the big-booted racism of chattel slavery, lynching, or even legalized segregation, but rather the more mundane and subtle or “invisible” racial attacks that increasingly are being documented in post–Jim Crow America. Examples include the student who rolls his eyes in class when he realizes that the black woman at the front of the room will be his professor or the black person checking out at the grocery store who gets hassled to show several forms of identification to cash her check when the white person in front of her did not. In many ways, microaggressions such as these are minor in comparison to the major assaults that African Americans historically have experienced and still do experience. At minimum, racial microaggressions are not spectacularly horrific in the way that the overt violence of shootings and chokeholds is. But just because we tend not to notice the destructiveness of racial microaggressions does not mean they are trivial. Racial microaggressions can be deadly, although we (especially white people) often don’t recognize or want to acknowledge their violent effects.

[Coppell’s card picks back up]

De facto white class privilege in the form of racial microaggressions contributes to people of color's "racial battle fatigue," which entails "the constant use or redirection of energy for coping against mundane racism which depletes psychological and physiological resources needed in other important, creative, and productive area of life" (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 40). Racial battle fatigue has been linked empirically to depression, tension, and generalized anxiety disorder in African Americans, and the stress associated with all of these psychological problems also contributes to physiological weathering that harms black health, contributing to high rates of hypertension, cardiovascular disease, pre-term birth rates, and infant mortality to name a few (Smith, Hung and Franklin 2012, 37, 40; D. Smith 2012). The effects of white racism literally get inside and help constitute the bodies of black people in harmful ways. They wear down the body's various systems by creating a high allostatic load via stressors that accumulate over time. The results are health problems such as disproportionately high rates of pre-term birth, infant mortality, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, and accelerated physiological aging (Blitstein 2009). Racism hurts—literally—and it also kills in ways that am subtler but no less deadly than the lyncher's noose or the neighbors Met (Drexler 2007). These effects, moreover, can be transgenerational, physiologically passed onto subsequent generations through various epigenetic changes (Sullivan 2013).

[Coppell’s card ends]

So what can black people do to mitigate the harmful effects of de facto white supremacy and racial microaggressions and to ward off racial battle fatigue? As the same study documents, the first answer is simply for them to realize the need for coping strategies that build resilience. Black people living in countries that formally have eliminated racial discrimination and yet that are still informally structured by white class privilege need to actively seek out ways to manage and resist racial battle fatigue. The second answer is that collective methods of coping are much more effective than individual ones. Social support systems that, for example, provide communal spaces for emotional expression and processing of experiences of racial microaggressions were most effective in helping African American people cope with race-related stress, as one recent study demonstrated about African American college students (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 39).

This advice might seem rather obvious, but it turns out that students in the study with high levels of hope that they could achieve their goals in life, school, and work generally did not use active coping strategies. They tended not to seek out social support or find venues in which they could share their experiences of white racism with others. The explanation for this behavior is that hope on the part of black students was empirically correlated with a sense of personal efficacy: the more that students thought they could individually surmount obstacles in their path, the greater their sense of hope for the future, and vice versa. And the greater their hope and sense of individual efficacy, the less likely a person was to seek out communities and networks with other black people. On the flip side, low-hope individuals did actively seek out social support systems. Because they did not have much hope that they could overcome the race-based obstacles in their path, they tended to seek out collective avenues for expressing their anger and frustration and for taking action against racism (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 39). The upshot here is that black hope not only did not serve as an effective coping strategy for black people, but it actually decreased the likelihood that they would seek out coping strategies that were effective.

This study of a mixed-gender group of African American college students is supported by another study focusing on African American men, which underscores that hope is not always or necessarily a healthy response to an unjust world. African American men with high to moderate levels of hope that racial justice would prevail experienced more stress when confronted with racial microaggressions than did African American men with low to moderate levels of hopefulness (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 50). It was low-hope African American men who best recognized the pervasiveness of racist discrimination in US society and thus developed racial socialization techniques that allowed them to keep the pernicious effects of racism at bay long enough to develop counterstrategies to it (2012, 50). While some scientific studies that do not consider race have lauded the health benefits of hope, demonstrating how hope can help the body reduce physical pain by triggering the release of natural analgesics such as endorphins and enkephalins (Groopman 2005, 175–179), we should not necessarily universalize these conclusions. “Hope [simply] does not have the same function in the context of African American men dealing with race-related stress and racial microaggressions as it does in previously studied contexts,” and thus promoting hope as a way for black Americans to combat the effects of white racism can be counterproductive to racial justice (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 51). It can tear down, rather than undergird black people by indirectly damaging their health and leading them to neglect effective social strategies for coping with white racism.

These studies provide concrete support for the claim that black hope is not a good alternative to the despair diagnosed by West in black American communities. It does not tend to help African Americans cope well with the insidious effects of white racism, and it even can contribute to a decline in black people’s psychological and physiological health. While West likely is right that black communities are crucial for black people to be able to withstand antiblack racism, it is important to note, in accordance with the above studies, that those communities that helped mitigate the harmful physiological effects of antiblack racism were not particularly based on hoping. They instead were based on coping. They were collective outlets for sharing experiences of and venting frustration about stressful racial encounters, for example, which is not the same thing as generating hope that antiblack racism can be eliminated.

What might black communities that cope look like? For starters, “coping” as used here does not mean surrendering, selling out, or merely getting by. Communities that cope would be communities that recognize that “nothing has worked” against antiblack racism and that black people “have exhausted the discourses of humanism and the strategies of equality” (Warren 2015, 228). I want to underscore the pragmatic significance of this recognition. Pragmatically understood, the value of things is found in their effects—including the ultimate effect of whether they enable flourishing (Sullivan 2001)—and the effect of humanism hasn’t been the flourishing of black people. Pursuing strategies of racial equality hasn’t worked. These realizations are important for the effects they can have: they allow a very different set of strategies in relationship to antiblack racism to emerge. Rather than defeatist, letting go of the goal of racial equality can be liberating and invigorating for black people. It can free them up to envision new goals, to develop new truths about how best to respond to racism, and thus to stop banging their heads against a wall that will not budge. “Casting off the equality ideology,” Bell urges, “will lift the sights…. From this broadened perspective on events and problems, [black people] can better appreciate and cope with racial subordination” (1992b, 378).

For example, Bell claims that rather than spend energy and time trying to fully integrate American schools—which still has not happened sixty years after Brown v. Board of Education and has been reversed in some major cities (see, e.g., Michelson, Smith, and Nelson 2015)—black people should work on raising money for and strengthening all-black schools (1992a, 63). More generally, racial realism would urge that black people devise strategies that acknowledge the “white self-interest principle”: white people will never do anything to improve the lives of black people unless it first and foremost benefits themselves as well, particularly economically (Bell 1992a, 54). In many ways, then, successfully fighting white racism is a very crude, non-sophisticated business. It isn’t about devising fancy moral arguments or ideal forms of jurisprudence; it instead involves “making a shameless appeal to the predictable self-interest of whites” and their wallets (1992a, 107).

One could add that it also relies on the predictable self-delusion, selfgrandeur, and racial ignorance of white people. Bell (1992a, 62) argues that black people—both individuals and communities—need to be like Brer Rabbit of the Uncle Remus stories, who tricks Brer Fox into setting him free by convincing Brer Fox that throwing Brer Rabbit into the briar patch is the worst thing that Brer Fox could ever do to him. Brer Fox acts in what he thinks is his own best interest—an interest in harming Brer Rabbit by keeping him captive—and in so doing, he does the very thing that enables Brer Rabbit to escape. A masterful tactician at manipulating the canine ignorance and solipsistic focus of Brer Fox, Brer Rabbit doesn’t rely on rational argumentation, nor does he depend on the law or any universal rights of animal kind to obtain his freedom. He instead is ruthlessly realistic about the malicious self-interest that motivates Brer Fox, and for that reason he is able to devise an effective strategy for getting out of his clutches. Brer Rabbit doesn’t succeed in making any sort of large-scale or structural change in the relationship between foxes and rabbits, nor does he particularly hope to. He instead focuses practically on how to save his life in the midst of a particular struggle with Brer Fox, and through his struggle, he is able to flourish even if the overarching tyranny of foxes has not been eliminated.

Because struggle is central to racial realism, racial realism is neither passive nor apathetic. It is not nihilist in the sense that West uses the term. But neither is it hopeful. Even though they might bear a superficial similarity, the struggle involved in racial realism isn’t the same struggle encouraged by West’s politics of hope. The struggle of political hope is for the fantastical object of a future without antiblack racism. It insists that “legitimate action takes place in the political” and that “a refusal to ‘do politics’ is equivalent to ‘doing nothing’ ” (Warren 2015, 223). The struggle of racial realism, in contrast, doesn’t involve believing that the right thing will win out. Bell’s racial realism invokes a different kind of existentialism than that of West, appealing to Camus (Bell 1992a, x). As Camus’s main character from The Plague (1991) understands, one resists and must resist the plague—whether in the form of mass death, the Nazi Holocaust, or in this case white class privilege and white supremacy—even though, or perhaps precisely because, one cannot conquer it. There is no ultimate progress or victory to anticipate, no matter whether human struggle is assisted by the divine. The plague might be beaten back for a while, but it always will return. Fighting it is absurd if the goal of the fight is to eliminate it. On Camus’s view, one fights the plague for different reasons, ones that have to do with affirming the dignity and value of humanity. Likewise, on Bell’s view, black people’s “struggle for freedom, is bottom, a manifestation of our humanity that survives and grows stronger through resistance to oppression, even if that oppression is never overcome” (1992b, 378). If this is a kind of humanism, it is absurd rather than progressive.

Bell implicitly develops this point in connection with black personhood when he tells the story of Mrs. MacDonald, an older black woman living in rural Mississippi in 1964 who was fighting white hostility and violent intimidation. When Bell asked her how she found the strength to carry on, she replied, “ ‘Derrick, I am an old woman. I lives to harass white folks’ ” (quoted in Bell 1992b, 378). As Bell points out, Mrs. MacDonald didn’t claim or even suggest that she thought she could eliminate white oppression with her harassment. Her spirited refusal to be beaten down by white domination was itself the point. It was how she triumphed against white racism, and even though her son lost his job, the bank tried to foreclose on her mortgage, and shots were fired through her living room window, “nothing the all-powerful whites could do would diminish her triumph” (1992b, 379). Bell concludes, “if you remember her story, you will understand my message” (1992b, 379). The message is that Mrs. MacDonald’s rebellious spirit was the most important element of her successful fight against white oppression, not whether she hopefully believed that racism could be ended or engaged in recognizable political action against it.

I am not interested in settling the question of whether Bell and Warren are right that racism is permanent in the United States. For starters, I think that the effects of this claim can change significantly when a white person makes it instead of a black one. The different subject positions that Bell and Warren, as black men, and I, a white woman, occupy are relevant, and a white person’s declaration that white racism will never end probably isn’t likely to help people of color fight it. Aside from that issue, I also am not sure how anyone, of any race, could ever know the Truth about racism or discern what the future holds for white-dominated nations such as the United States. What is more useful than an epistemological claim of certainty is a pragmatic claim about the permanence of racism. Acknowledging that the truth of a claim is found—or rather, made—not in whether it mirrors the way that the world “really” is but in the practical effects that it has in the world, we should ask: what personal and institutional practices, habits, and behaviors would result if black people engaged in the world knowing that racism isn’t going away? What strategies for black flourishing might emerge if black people acted on the hypothesis that, beneath a thin veneer of wanting to appear nonracist, most white people do not really want to abolish white class privilege and white domination?

On this score, I would wager that Bell and Warren are right: hoping and struggling politically for the end of racism is less advantageous to black people than approaching racism as permanent. Black people are more likely to develop strategies for surviving and thriving if they give up on political hope. If that pragmatic hypothesis bears fruit—and it needs to be tested in the lives and experiences of black people to know if it does— then black people should relinquish hope for racial equality and instead creatively tap into and devise other strategies to help black people thrive. More so than West’s progressive hope, Bell’s and Warren’s provocative gambles concerning the permanence of antiblack racism could open up practical possibilities for America’s future that step outside the civil rights box in which it largely has been contained for the past sixty years.

A related reason Bell’s and Warren’s positions are pragmatically preferable to that of West is that they are likely to do a better job of protecting black people from the weathering effects of racial microaggressions and other forms of racial discrimination. Low-hope black people do not experience the same psychophysiological effects of stress from white racism as high-hope black people do. This means that they will tend to be more psychosomatically resilient in order to withstand and struggle against white domination, and resilience, which should not be confused with hope, has been empirically linked with low levels of cortisol in response to stressful or negative events (Groopman 2005, 204–205). The physical health of low hope black people—rates of hypertension and cardiovascular disease, for example—should tend to be better than those whose stress hormone levels spike out of surprised disappointment when their expectations of racial equality are disappointed. And thus their spiritual health—their emotional strength and creative energy—also should be better than that of high hope individuals.